The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
19.
The first
Gulf Conflict had highlighted inadequacies in the UK’s asset
tracking
and Combat
ID equipment.
20.
The UK
deployed an armoured division during the Gulf Conflict in 1991,
Operation
GRANBY,
comprising two combat brigades: 4 Brigade and 7 Armoured
Brigade.8
21.
The MOD
identified a number of lessons relating to equipment following
the
1991 Gulf
Conflict in its Statement
on the Defence Estimates in
1992.9
It found
that
deficiencies
in the reliability of older equipment had “considerable
implications” for the
UK’s
operational capability, and were “only overcome by a
disproportionate application
of
maintenance effort and deployment of spares”.
22.
The MOD also
found that the volume of stores and equipment that had to be
moved
to theatre,
and the compressed timescales involved, led to problems with the
visibility
of
stockholdings and items in transit.10
A temporary
system was devised for tracking
operationally
vital items but the MOD was examining “improved arrangements for
the
future”.
The system for allocating priorities in the movement of freight was
“overloaded
by the
volume of high priority items” and a review had been commissioned
to learn the
lessons
from the operation.
23.
A secure and
effective battlefield electronic identification system, which
later
became
known as Combat ID,11
“did not
exist” during Op GRANBY. While practical
steps were
taken to avoid engagements between Coalition Forces, a number
of
incidents occurred.
24.
The MOD stated
that the UK was working with the US “to identify technical
and
operational
options” to minimise the risk of further incidents. The Defence
Research
Agency was
“also undertaking a research programme aimed at assessing both
short
term
solutions and options for the longer term”.
25.
Concerns
about progress on asset tracking systems were raised in
Public
Accounts
Committee reports in 1993, 1997 and 2000.
26.
A Public
Accounts Committee report in 1993 on the first Gulf Conflict stated
that it
was
“concerned the Department did not have a sound system for tracking
freight”.12
8
Ministry of
Defence, Statement
on the Defence Estimates – Britain’s Defence for the
90s, July
1991,
Cm 1559.
9
Ministry of
Defence, Statement
on the Defence Estimates, July 1992,
Cm 1981.
10
Ministry of
Defence, Statement
on the Defence Estimates, July 1992,
Cm 1981.
11 Combat ID
enables military forces to distinguish friend from foe during
operations, minimising the risk of
accidental
destruction of friendly or allied forces, otherwise known as
fratricide or Blue-on-Blue incidents.
The systems
and procedures in place must be interoperable with those used by
allied forces.
12
Twenty-sixth
Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session
1993-94, Ministry of
Defence:
Movements of
Personnel, Equipment and Stores to and from the
Gulf, HC 393,
paras 18-19.
6