The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
573.
Representatives
of BP, Shell and British Gas met Baroness Symons on 31
October
to discuss
their concerns.329
Mr Christopher
Segar, Head of the FCO’s Aviation Maritime
and Energy
Department (AMED), reported that all three companies had argued
that
they had
been scrupulous in observing sanctions but were keen to play a part
in any
reconstruction
effort. They did not want a privileged position but equally did not
want to
be “locked
out” through deals done by the US for wider political purposes.
They wanted
a “level
playing field”.
574.
In response,
Baroness Symons had said that, given the Russians’
considerable
economic
interest in Iraq, it was “very possible that a deal or deals” might
be under
discussion
in the US.
575.
Baroness
Symons reported her meeting to Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign
Secretary,
and
commented:
“I said
that we could not make any definitive undertakings [on securing
contracts],
given our
determination that any action in relation to Iraq is prompted by
our
concerns
over WMD, and not a desire for commercial gains.
“However, I
undertook to draw this issue to your attention as a matter of
urgency.
They were
genuinely convinced that deals were being struck and that
British
interests
are being left to one side.”330
576.
The British
Embassy Washington reported on 31 October that it had reassured
BP
representatives
that the Embassy had seen no evidence of any deals.331
The
Embassy
had agreed
to “keep a watchful eye”.
577.
The Cabinet
Office reported to Sir David Manning on 31 October that
the
instruction
to departments not to engage with external actors on contingency
planning
for
post-conflict Iraq (confirmed in the record of the first meeting of
the AGHI on
20
September) was, in practice, being overtaken.332
There was
particular pressure for
consultation
from the UK oil industry; a delegation from BP would be visiting
the FCO
on 6
November.
578.
The FCO hosted
a presentation on Iraqi energy on 6 November given by a
team
from
BP.333
Mr Rycroft
sent the record of the presentation to Mr Jonathan
Powell,
Mr Blair’s
Chief of Staff, and Sir David Manning as evidence of why Iraq
was so
329
Minute
Segar to PS/Baroness Symons, 31 October 2002, ‘Iraq
Oil’.
330
Minute
Symons to Straw, 1 November 2002, ‘Iraqi Oil and Gas’.
331
Telegram
1418 Washington to FCO London, 31 October 2002, ‘BP & Iraqi
Oil’.
332
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 31 October 2002, ‘Iraq: After the UNSCR’.
333
Minute FCO
[junior official] to Arthur, 13 November 2002, ‘BP/Iraqi
Energy’.
334
Manuscript
comment Rycroft, 18 November 2002, on Minute FCO [junior official]
to Arthur,
13 November
2002, ‘BP/Iraqi Energy’.
460