The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
With “his
long record of obstruction and deceit”, Saddam Hussein
was
“unlikely
to make an honest declaration”; the UK wanted “to see his
dishonesty
demonstrated
by inspections” if he made a false declaration.
•
The UK
would not allow the process “to become an indefinite game of
hide
and seek”.
211.
In a
discussion between No.10 and FCO officials and a team of US
officials on
2 December,
one senior US official expressed doubts about whether the
inspectors
would ever
find any WMD evidence.64
212.
In a separate
meeting between FCO and MOD officials and the team of
US
officials,
it was suggested that the strategy of “force of [sic] mind” had not
got through to
Saddam
Hussein, partly it was thought because of the mixed signals from
France and
Russia.65
One US
official thought that once he did get that message Saddam’s
position
might
“shift very quickly”.
213.
Concerns were
also expressed about the activities of Al Qaida in northern
Iraq.
214.
On 3 and 4
December, Sir David Manning discussed the need to avoid
making
snap
judgements on the Iraqi declaration and the advantages of allowing
Dr Blix time
to make the
first formal response with Dr Rice.66
They also
discussed the need to avoid
“the
prospect of a protracted game of hide and seek, waiting to see
whether Saddam
could be
caught out, or whether he would make a mistake”.
215.
Sir David
recorded that the US Administration was “now thinking hard about
what
might
constitute triggers” and asked the FCO for advice on that before a
telephone call
between
Mr Blair and President Bush the following week.
216.
On 5 December,
Mr Straw told Cabinet that the Iraqi declaration was “likely
to be
lengthy”
and “designed to show dissension inside the United
Nations”.67
It was
“unlikely
to be fully
compliant”. The weapons inspectorates should be “encouraged to make
a
proper
assessment”.
217.
No further
discussion on Iraq was recorded.
218.
The FCO
advised on 6 December that there was no agreement in the
Security
Council on
precise criteria for what would constitute a material breach. Each
case
would need
to be considered in the light of circumstances.
219.
The FCO
position was increasingly shifting from a single
specific
incident
demonstrating a material breach to the need to establish a pattern
of
64
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 2 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Talks with US Officials
2 December’.
65
Minute
Ehrman to Private Secretary [FCO], 2 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Visit of
Wolfowitz and Grossman’.
66
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 3 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’; Letter Manning
to McDonald,
4 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
67
Cabinet
Conclusions, 5 December 2002.
40