The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
On 15
August, Dr Sabri sent a further letter to Mr Annan,
repeating the offer of technical
discussions
and asking for answers to questions to the questions it had
presented to the
Security
Council in March 2002.31
80.
The British
Embassy Washington warned that many in the US
Administration
were
talking about “when” military action would be taken, not “if”; and
that the
views of
Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld were likely to prevail
over
those of
Secretary Powell.
81.
Following
their discussion on 26 July (see Section 3.3), Mr Straw had
agreed with
Secretary
Powell that he should make an unpublicised visit to the USA on 20
August.
82.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy Washington,
wrote
to
Mr Straw’s Private Office on 15 August to provide “a snapshot
of the public mood and
what we are
hearing from contacts on Iraq”.32
He
wrote:
“Despite
repeated affirmations that no decisions have yet been taken, there
is a
general
assumption that the [US] Administration is moving towards military
action
to remove
Saddam … The private language of the … majority of those to
whom
we speak is
‘when rather than if’. There have been a string of … leaks from
the
Pentagon
about the feasibility and means of doing this … the President held
a
carefully
publicised meeting with Franks at the start of this month to look
at military
options.
Over the past few days we have begun to hear a consistent line from
the
Administration
… on why Saddam should be removed (BW [biological
weapons/
warfare],
links to terrorism, threat to neighbouring states, brutal
oppressor). And
[John]
Bolton [US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International
Security]
told me yesterday that the US is planning to run a roadshow in the
Autumn
about the
threat of Iraq’s WMD.
“This does
not mean the matter is yet settled. The debate on military tactics
has
died down
and is now focusing on some other very big problems. These
include
widely
publicised fears about possible use by Saddam of his WMD and the
risk of
Israel
being drawn in to a war … and the need to build more international
support for
US actions.”
83.
Mr Brenton
advised that the US felt a:
“… strong
diplomatic and presentational need for the support, and
perhaps
involvement,
of a few key allies – with the UK close to the top of the list.
They of
31
UN Security
Council, 15 August 2002, ‘Letter dated 15 August 2002 from the
Permanent Representative
of Iraq to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary‑General’ attaching
‘Letter Sabri to Annan,
15 August
2002’, (S/2002/939).
32
Letter
Brenton to Private Secretary [FCO], 15 August 2002,
‘Iraq’.
108