6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
and
re-order equipment already en route. This added to the burden on
the already
over‑stretched
system.”308
583.
The MOD stated
that “these problems were caused by the continuing lack
of
a robust
tri-Service inventory system, the ability to track equipment into
and through
theatre,
and an information system capable of supporting this
technology.”
584.
The NAO
recommended in December 2003 that:
“The
Department should, as a matter of urgency, continue to work to
develop
appropriate
logistics systems to track materiel to theatre and ensure its
timely
delivery to
frontline units.”309
585.
On
30 January 2004, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to
No.10 with a summary
of lessons
learned from Op TELIC, drawing “heavily” on the lines Mr Hoon
intended to
use before
the House of Commons Defence Committee the following
week.310
He
wrote:
“We have
consistently acknowledged that some things did not go as well as
we
would have
wished. In evidence to HCDC last May Mr Hoon acknowledged
that
there were
bound to be some problems in a logistics operation of this size,
and
that some
of our personnel may have experienced shortages of equipment.
Our
subsequent
work and that of the NAO has shown that these shortages were
more
widespread
and in some respects more serious than we believed to be the case
at
that
time.
“In general
this was not the result of a failure to obtain and deploy the
equipment
required.
There is room for debate about the balance between routinely
holding
items in
our inventory and relying on our ability to generate
operation-specific
equipment
in short timescales. But a major problem, in our analysis, was that
there
were
serious shortcomings in our ability to track consignments and
assets through
theatre,
and to distribute them in a timely fashion to the front
line.”
586.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote that the MOD had “identified
numerous
other areas
for further work” and had, for example, increased its stockholdings
of
desert clothing
and boots and NBC Individual Protective Equipment sets by
an
additional 32,000.
587.
The House of
Commons Defence Committee concluded that:
“We are in
no doubt that one of the key lessons to emerge from Operation
TELIC
concerns
operational logistic support and specifically, the requirement for
a robust
308
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
309
National
Audit Office, Operation
TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq,
11 December 2003,
HC 60.
310
Minute
PS/SofS [MOD] to No.10, 30 January 2004, ‘Op TELIC –
Readiness, Equipment, Logistics
& Lessons
Learned’.
95