5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
504.
Ms Adams
described the purpose of the meeting between Lord Goldsmith
and
No.10
officials on 27 February as to “discuss the French veto”, and her
advice dismissed
the concept
of an “unreasonable” veto. The advice and Lord Goldsmith’s
subsequent
account to
Mr Brummell of the discussion did not address the question of
the legality
of action
in the face of a veto.
505.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, raised the absence of
an
agreed
legal basis for military action with Sir Andrew Turnbull on 5
March.
506.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit wrote to Sir Andrew Turnbull on 5 March
stating:
“I am sure
you have this in hand already, but in case it might help, I should
like to
offer you
my thoughts on the procedure for handling the legal basis for any
offensive
operations
… in Iraq – a subject touching on my responsibilities since it is
the CDS
[Chief of
the Defence Staff] who will need to be assured that he will be
acting on the
basis of a
lawful instruction from the Prime Minister and the Defence
Secretary.
“It is not
possible to be certain about the precise circumstances in which
this would
arise
because we cannot be sure about the UN scenario involved … Clearly
full UN
cover is
devoutly to be desired – and not just for the military operation
itself …
“My purpose
in writing, however, is not to argue the legal merits of the case …
but to
flag up …
that the call to action from President Bush could come at quite
short notice
and that we
need to be prepared to handle the legalities so we can deliver
…
“In these
circumstances, I suggest that the Prime Minister should be
prepared
to convene
a special meeting of the inner ‘war’ Cabinet (Defence and
Foreign
Secretaries
certainly, Chancellor, DPM [Deputy Prime Minister], Home
Secretary
possibly,
Attorney General, crucially) at which CDS effectively receives his
legal and
constitutional
authorisation. We have already given the Attorney General
information
and MOD
briefings on objectives and rationale, and I understand that John
Scarlett
[Chairman
of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)] is conducting further
briefing on
the basis
of the intelligence material.
“While it
is not possible to predict the timing of the event precisely … [it]
could
conceivably
be as early as 10 March … in the event, albeit unlikely, that
the
Americans
lost hope in the UN and move fast. Michael Jay may have a better
fix on
this, but I
guess the more likely timing would be for Security Council action
around
the weekend
of 15/16 March, and therefore for a meeting after
that.”207
507.
Copies of the
letter were sent to Sir Michael Jay and Sir David
Manning.
508.
Sir Michael
commented that both Adml Boyce and General Sir Mike
Jackson,
Chief of
the General Staff, had told him that they would need “explicit
legal
207
Letter
Tebbit to Turnbull, 5 March 2003, [untitled].
91