6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
imposed by
these uncertainties, we have been considering the contribution we
might
be able to
make if military action ultimately becomes necessary.
“At this
stage it would be inappropriate to go into details of the size and
shape
of forces
that might be involved, for two specific reasons. First, as events
unfold
and time
passes, plans will inevitably evolve. It would be misleading to
describe
specific
force packages today as if they had some permanent and definitive
status
… Secondly,
as I am sure the House appreciates, I have no intention of
assisting
Saddam
Hussein’s contingency planning.”427
1088.
By late
November, there was growing recognition that the delay
was
likely to
affect the UK’s readiness to deploy ground forces in time to
participate
in the
initial stage of the US plan; and that Turkey’s agreement might not
be
forthcoming.
1089.
Maj Gen Fry’s
advice, submitted to Adm Boyce on 22 November, suggested
that
it would
take some four months from the order to deploy for the northern
option (whether
Package 2
or 3), and more than five months for the southern
option.428
1090.
Maj Gen Fry
provided a discussion paper on the potential UK response to
a
Running
Start to military operations on 25 November.429
He asked
the Chiefs of Staff to
confirm if
it wished the UK to be involved in early action against Iraq and
the extent to
which the
UK should seek to match US timelines for the northern
axis.
1091.
The paper
stated that the UK’s ability to match US timelines for Package 3
and
the
Amphibious Ready Group was “in doubt”, but the UK position was
“recoverable” if
a range of
measures were “taken in the near future to reduce the overall risk
and time”.
Early
notification of the forces involved and availability of civilian
shipping were identified
as the most
critical measures.
1092.
Maj Gen Fry
wrote that much of the information had been provided orally and
the
paper
lacked some of the detail which would normally be required by the
Chiefs of Staff.
1093.
In a
manuscript comment to Adm Boyce, one of his staff wrote
that:
•
The UK
“could look v. silly if we could not take part in a running
start”.
•
There was:
“No argument for not starting” preparations for the call‑out
of
Reserves.
427
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25
November 2002, columns 126‑127.
428
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 22 November 2002, ‘Potential Operations in
Iraq – Northern and
Southern
Timelines’.
429
Paper
DCJO(Ops) [to COSSEC], 25 November 2002, ‘The UK Response to a
Running Start for Combat
Operations
– COA2’.
339