The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Group warned that “more organised opposition to the Coalition may be emerging”13 as

discontent about the Coalition’s failure to deliver a secure environment began to grow

in the Iraqi population.

58. The extent of the decline in Baghdad and central Iraq overshadowed the decline in

MND(SE). Food shortages and the failure of essential services such as the supply of

electricity and water, plus lack of progress in the political process, however, began to

erode the relationship between UK forces and the local population. The deterioration

was exemplified by attacks on UK forces in Majar al-Kabir in Maysan province on

22 and 24 June.

59. As the summer wore on, authoritative sources in the UK, such as the JIC, began to

identify issues with the potential to escalate into conflict and to recognise the likelihood

that extremist groups would become more co-ordinated. The constraint imposed on

reconstruction activities by the lack of security began to be apparent. Mr Sawers and

Sir David Manning expressed concern about whether the UK had sufficient troops

deployed in MND(SE), and about the permeability of Maysan’s substantial border

with Iran.

60. From early July, security was seen in Whitehall as the key concern and was raised

by Mr Blair with President Bush.

61. A circular analysis began to develop, in which progress on reconstruction required

security to be improved, and improved security required the consent generated by

reconstruction activity. Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

(Commitments), reported “a decline in Iraqi consent to the Coalition in MND(SE) due to

the failure by the Coalition to deliver improvements in essential services” and that Shia

leaders were warning of a short grace period before further significant deterioration.

62. By the autumn of 2003, violence was escalating in Baghdad and attacks were

becoming more sophisticated. Attacks on the UN in August and September, which

injured and killed a number of UN officials including the UN Special Representative for

Iraq, prompted some organisations to withdraw their international staff. Although Basra

was less turbulent than the capital, the risk of a ripple effect from Baghdad – as identified

by Gen Jackson in May – remained.

63. The JIC assessed on 3 September that the security environment would probably

worsen over the year ahead. There had been a number of serious attacks on the

Coalition in MND(SE), and Islamic “extremists/terrorists”14 were expected to remain a

long-term threat in Iraq. The UK’s military and civilian representatives on the ground

were reporting a growing insurgency in central Iraq.

13 Minute SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 10 June 2003, ‘OP COS Paper: UK contribution to Iraq: strategic intent

and direction’ attaching Paper SPG, 9 June 2003, ‘UK contribution to Iraq: strategic intent and direction’.

14 JIC Assessment, 3 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Threats to Security’.

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