The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
846.
The SDR stated
that a range of advanced systems were planned or
already
entering
service, including the airborne ground surveillance radar, Astor,
and a battlefield
unmanned
target acquisition vehicle, Phoenix.
847.
The Strategic
Defence Review: A New Chapter in 2002
reiterated that ISTAR
was a key
element of the MOD’s network‑centric capability.452
It stated
that the US had
demonstrated
in Afghanistan the effectiveness of such systems in providing
persistent
surveillance
without putting aircrew lives at risk: “Our Watchkeeper project has
the same
purpose;
and we intend to accelerate the programme.”
848.
The
Watchkeeper programme was initiated to address the capability gap
for a
tactical
UAV that could provide operational commanders with a persistent,
all‑weather
ISTAR
capability.
849.
On 7 January
2004, Lt Gen Fulton told the House of Commons
Defence
Committee
that Watchkeeper was “due in service in 2005‑06”.453
850.
The
Government’s Response to the Committee’s report on 8 June stated
that the
main
investment decision was “due later in 2004”, at which point a
formal In Service
Date (ISD)
would be set.454
851.
That date was
provided in the National Audit Office (NAO) report on the
MOD’s
Major
Projects in November 2004.455
The target
date for Watchkeeper’s Main Gate
approval
was December 2004 and the internal planning assumptions for its
entry into
service was
November 2006.
852.
A minute from
Lieutenant General Andrew Ridgway, Chief of Defence
Intelligence,
on 22 June
2004 indicated that Phoenix was the only UAV in service in
2003.456
It
had been
procured in 1988 against a requirement to support operations in
north‑west
Europe,
predominantly as a target acquisition system. The system was
subsequently
used in the
Balkans and in Iraq.
853.
Lt Gen Ridgway
wrote that it had been described as “battle winning
equipment”
during the
invasion and had successfully been deployed on wider surveillance
roles
in addition
to providing target acquisition information. Phoenix had not,
however, been
designed
“to operate in the extreme heat of Iraq”.
452
Ministry of
Defence, The
Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, July
2002.
453
Third
Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2003‑04, Lessons of
Iraq,
HC 57‑I,
para 235.
454
First
Special Report of the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2003‑04, Lessons of
Iraq:
Government
Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2003‑04,
HC 635, para
104.
455
National
Audit Office, 10 November 2004, Ministry of
Defence: Major Projects Report 2004.
456
Minute CDI
to APS/SofS [MOD], 22 June 2004, ‘ISTAR Provision to Op TELIC – UK
UAV Operations’.
146