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4.1  |  Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
349.  Mr Williams told the Inquiry that he could “recall feeling it necessary” to produce
the note, “though not what internal or external event prompted this”, and that “clearly
there was a heightened activity in Whitehall at the time”.156
350.  The proposals were discussed in a meeting held by Mr Straw on 18 March. That is
addressed later in this Section.
351.  Mr Blair concluded on 17 March that the papers he had been given on Iraq
did not constitute a properly worked out strategy and that he would need to
provide the US with a far more intelligent and detailed analysis of a game plan if
the UK was to influence its decisions.
352.  That included a need to “re-order our story and message” to address the
limited support for a policy of regime change.
353.  In a minute to Mr Jonathan Powell, his Chief of Staff, on 17 March, Mr Blair noted
the absence of a “proper worked-out strategy” on Iraq, and the need to provide the US
“with a far more intelligent and detailed analysis of a game plan”.157
354.  Mr Blair wrote:
“The persuasion job on this seems very tough. My own side are worried. Public
opinion is fragile. International opinion – as I found at the EU – is pretty sceptical.
“Yet from a centre-left perspective, the case should be obvious …”
355.  Mr Blair acknowledged that “the immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously
worse than 3 years ago”. He concluded: “So we have to re-order our story and message.
Increasingly I think [these] should be about the nature of the regime.”
356.  Asked to explain the thinking in his minute, Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, in relation
to WMD, the:
“… question was about the changed assessment of the risk and the difficulty of
making the case that Saddam Hussein posed a threat.”158
Decisions to focus the dossier on Iraq but to postpone publication
357.  Mr Straw concluded that the draft paper on WMD programmes of concern
should be replaced by one solely on Iraq. A more general paper on other countries
might be issued later.
358.  Officials in No.10 agreed.
156  Statement, December 2010, page 2.
157  Minute Prime Minister to Powell, 17 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
158  Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 43-45.
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