The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
74.
Dr Rice told
the 9/11 Commission that President Bush had called her that day
to
say the
focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted plans for
Iraq should
the country
take some action or the US Administration eventually determine that
it had
been involved
in the 9/11 attacks.41
75.
The 9/11
Commission reported that there was some further discussion of Phase
2
of the war
on terrorism, at a meeting in Washington of the National Security
Council on
17 September.
President Bush had ordered the Defense Department to be ready to
deal
with Iraq
if Baghdad acted against US interests, with plans to include
possibly occupying
Iraqi
oilfields. Within the Pentagon, Mr Wolfowitz had continued to press
the case for
dealing
with Iraq.
76.
Secretary
Rumsfeld provided guidance on 19 September to US
commanders
working on
their contingency plans.
77.
The Commission
reported that General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief
CENTCOM (US
Central Command), told them that he:
“… recalled
receiving Rumsfeld’s guidance that each regional commander
should
assess what
these plans meant for his area of responsibility. He [Franks] knew
he
would soon
be striking the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan. But, he told
us, he
now
wondered how that action was connected to what might be needed to
be done
in Somalia,
Yemen or Iraq. The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed
his
appeal for
further military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after
9/11 …
Franks said
that President Bush again turned down the request.”
78.
The JIC
assessed on 18 September that the attacks on 11 September had
set
a new
benchmark for terrorist atrocity and terrorists seeking comparable
impact
might use
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) devices. But
only
Islamic
extremists such as those who shared Usama Bin Laden’s agenda
had
the
motivation to pursue attacks with the deliberate aim of causing
maximum
casualties.
79.
The
potential threat to UK interests would be higher the more closely
the UK
was
identified with the US.
80.
Following a
request from Mr Blair, for a reassessment of the nature and scale
of the
threat
posed to the UK by terrorism and the contingency plans for dealing
with it, the JIC
considered
whether the scale and nature of the terrorist threat to the UK had
changed.42
41
Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States.
The 9/11
Commission Report. Norton. Page
335.
42
Minutes, 14
September 2001, JIC meeting.
326