4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
204.
On Iraq’s
nuclear weapon programmes, Mr Hoon was told:
“•
Until 1991
Iraq had a massive nuclear weapon project. If the Gulf War had
not
intervened,
it might have produced a crude nuclear device by late
1993.
•
It is
assessed that Iraq has no capability to manufacture weapons-usable
fissile
material.
However, some dual-use material may still be in the
inventory.
•
With the
departure of the IAEA … in December 1998, Iraq could
have
recommenced
nuclear weapons activity as it retains skilled scientists
and
weapons
design information.
•
If
sanctions were lifted or became ineffective Iraq could possibly
develop its first
nuclear
weapon – a crude weapon for air-delivery – in 5-7 years; and a
further
2-3 years
to produce a warhead for missile delivery. These timelines could
be
shortened
if it has procured fissile material from abroad.”
205.
On Iraq’s
chemical weapons programme, Mr Hoon was told:
•
“We assess
that Iraq probably retains a stockpile, which could easily amount
to
more than
100 tonnes of agent.”
•
“Iraq has
the capability to start the production of significant amounts of
mustard
agent
immediately, and the production of nerve agent within weeks of a
decision
to do
so.”
206.
In a letter of
27 February, Mr Ehrman questioned what was meant by
the
description
of Saddam Hussein as the centre of gravity of Iraq’s WMD
programmes,
asking
whether it was “too sanguine to suggest, if that is the intention,
that his removal
would
necessarily bring them to an end”.96
207.
Mr Ehrman
expressed surprise at Mr Webb’s assertion that “the bombing in
1998
helped to
halt Iraqi progress in developing nuclear weapons”, commenting that
the FCO
understanding
was that that was “not among the claims we made at the
time”.
208.
The evidence
in Section 1.1 on the dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear programme
and
the
objectives of Operation Desert Fox supports Mr Ehrman’s
point.
209.
The UK’s
understanding of the impact of Desert Fox is set out in the Box
below.
The JIC
assessed in May 2001 that Operation Desert Fox had:
•
set back parts
of the ballistic missile programme by up to a year;
•
not attacked
CW facilities;
•
damaged the
castor oil plant, but there was no known impact on BW
capability;
96
Letter
Ehrman to Webb, 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of Evil’.
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