The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

378.  On 8 March, DCC Brand’s weekly report described the creation of a new “umbrella

structure”, the Office of Security Co‑operation (OSC), commanded by Major General

Paul Eaton, the former commander of CMATT. 328 CMATT and the newly named policing

equivalent – the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) – would report

to the OSC. A diagram of “Command and Control Relationships” showed the OSC

reporting to CJTF‑7.

379.  The creation of OSC resulted in a complex structure for police reform: CPATT

became responsible for recruiting, training, equipping and mentoring the police but the

CPA/MOI retained the operational and institution‑building element of police reform.

380.  CMATT and CPATT were both led by UK officers: Brigadier Nigel Aylwin‑Foster

and Brigadier Andrew MacKay respectively.329

381.  Former DCC Brand told the Inquiry that the creation of OSC was:

“… quite a shock to both myself and the American director [Mr Casteel] because,

overnight, the Secretary of Defense in the United States had basically taken away

all responsibility for policing, including the training, equipping and recruiting, and

given it to the military, and that included a budget that was US$950m. We had had

no indication of this and neither he nor I actually knew where it left us. So we went

to see Ambassador Bremer to say, ‘Can you give us some direction as to what our

responsibilities will be?’ and I don’t think he was too clear either on what the impact

of this was. The military were very clear that it was just theirs and this would tidy

things up … it was rather draconian in terms of its mood, and the consequences …

one was that, whilst they could do the volume stuff, they still didn’t have the skill

sets for basic training, and then the one thing they didn’t have, which was just so

essential, and which the military training side had, is that policy advice back in

Washington on policing. They had none. So they were making it up, in that sense,

from theatre, rather than back at the policy headquarters.” 330

382.  On 2 April, the Cabinet Office sent an update for Ministers, in between two

meetings of the AHMGIR, stating that police training was to be accelerated under the

new structures with a target of completing in‑service training of 43,000 officers by

January 2005.331 There were plans to expand the capacity of the Baghdad and Mosul

training academies. The update also highlighted a “critical shortfall” in equipment for the

police, the border police and the army. That was put down to issues with US contracting

and funding.

328  Minute Brand, 8 March 2004, ‘Report from Iraq – Douglas Brand’.

329  BBC News, 11 January 2006, UK officer slams US Iraq tactics; Associated Press, 10 June 2004,

Iraq Police Training A Flop.

330  Public hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 94‑95.

331  Letter Dodd to Owen, 2 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Update’.

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