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9.7  |  May 2008 to October 2009
364.  Sir Nigel reported that the President had drawn a number of “lessons learned”
from Iraq:
that to go to war the US needed clearly defined goals;
that funding for wars should be included in the budget as part of wider
transparency about the costs of war;
that the US would expand its civilian national security capacity; and
that the US had learned “the importance of working closely with friends and
allies”.
365.  In a section of the speech addressed “directly to the people of Iraq”, President
Obama praised Iraq’s history, civilisation and fortitude in recent decades, and continued:
“… let me be clear about America’s intentions. The United States pursues no
claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the
tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek a full transition to
Iraqi responsibility for the security of your country. And going forward, we can build
a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect as Iraq
takes its rightful place in the community of nations.”
366.  On the same day as President Obama’s announcement, the Cabinet Office
provided Mr Brown with an update on Iraq.148 It recorded that there had been “a slight
deterioration” in security, including the deadliest single attack for three months which
had killed 55 civilians.
367.  Basra remained calm, and the training of 14 Division was “virtually complete”,
meaning that embedded UK mentoring teams would start to pull out from early March.
The UK government had assisted six investor visits in the previous week.
March 2009
368.  After a year in post as SBMR-I, Lt Gen Cooper handed over to Lt Gen Chris Brown
on 3 March 2009.149 In his end of tour report Lt Gen Cooper wrote that:
“… 2008-09 was a very significant year in the Iraq campaign. It built on previous
events in security terms but perhaps the key event was the assertiveness of Maliki in
dealing with Shia militias that then gave him the credibility and authority to establish
the writ of government across Iraq … Notwithstanding the risks and fault lines that
remain in Iraq and the weakness of the economic position, the glass is half full, with
regular drips of progress entering it.”
148 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 27 February 2009, ‘Iraq: Update’.
149 Report Cooper, [undated], ‘End of Tour Report 4 Mar 09 to 3 Mar 09’.
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