The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
758.
Lord
Goldsmith’s view that resolution 1441 authorised the use of force
relied on
the conclusion
that OP4:
“…
constituted a determination in advance that if the particular set
of circumstances
specified
in it arose, so that Iraq failed to take the final opportunity it
had been given,
that would
constitute a further material breach.
“The
resolution therefore constituted authority for the use of force
provided that
such a
factual situation had occurred, namely that Iraq had failed to
comply with
and
co-operate fully in the implementation of the resolution. In that
event a Council
discussion
would need to take place.
“I had
concluded that in any such Council discussion the assessment
contemplated
by OP4 was
not an assessment of the quality of the breaches, since the
Council
had already
resolved that any failure on Iraq’s part would constitute a
material
breach, but
rather an assessment of the situation as a result of those
breaches
having
occurred … Accordingly, the Council did not need to conclude that
breaches
had taken
place (though I believe that at the discussion no member of the
Security
Council
took the view that they had not occurred).
“Nonetheless
the authorisation in resolution 678 could not revive unless in
fact
breaches
had occurred. We needed therefore to be satisfied that this
factual
situation
existed, and to be in a position if necessary to justify that to a
court.
That was
why I said … that there would have to be strong factual grounds
for
concluding
that Iraq had failed to take the final
opportunity.”321
759.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote:
“As I
explained giving my oral evidence, this was an issue on which I
wanted the
Prime
Minister consciously and deliberately to focus, hence my request
for written
confirmation
that he had reached this view.”322
760.
The Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘The
Butler Report’)
records it
was:
“… told
that, in coming to his view that Iraq was in further material
breach, the Prime
Minister
took account both of the overall intelligence picture and of
information from
a wide
range of other sources, including especially UNMOVIC
information.”323
321
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraphs 5.6-5.7.
322
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 5.7.
323
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
385.
136