The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
378.
Sir Jeremy
stated that the Council “had to be clear that the ship of the
Security
Council was
heading for an iceberg”. The UK’s proposal:
“… was a
repair job … The whole point was to avoid military action. We could
not
go blindly
on with 1284 without the crucial missing ingredient – Iraq’s full
and
willing
co‑operation.”
379.
Addressing
specific questions that had been raised, the points made
by
Sir Jeremy included:
•
“The UK
would take yes for an answer if the tests were completed in
their
totality.
The tests were not impossible and would make it blindingly obvious
if
Iraq had
taken a strategic decision to disarm …”
•
“[W]e might
not have to vote as early as 14 March if there was traction … If
there
was no
traction we would likely vote on 14 March on the current
text.”
•
“The
co-sponsors … had agreed on the package and wanted to see
the
Council’s
response.”
•
“[T]he more
people who joined us the more the judgement of compliance
would
be a
collective one. We valued the judgement of the inspectors, but it
was for
the members
who signed up to the statement … to assess whether the
tests
had been
satisfied. 1441 did not specify who would make the judgement
on
compliance
– that was one of its ambiguities – but if the tests were
collective,
the UK
had no problem with the judgement being collective”.
•
“[W]ithout
OP3 our resolution would not be an ultimatum …”
•
“[I]f there
was traction on this idea, the UK would be committed to
getting
maximum
time. But it was not possible at this stage to give a firm date and
the
flexibility
for extra time was very limited …”
380.
France,
Germany and Russia had all responded that the draft resolution,
“even
without
OP3”, would still authorise force. Sir Jeremy replied
that:
“… without
OP3, the resolution would be a restatement of resolution 1441
…
There was
no way out of the dilemma … unless we delivered Iraqi
co-operation.
We were
trying to offer a means of doing that. We had to rally, not to camp
on
national positions.”
381.
Sir Jeremy
commented that the initiative had resulted in:
“•
genuine
expressions of warmth from the U-6 for taking them
seriously;
•
recognition
that the UK had made a real effort to find a way through
for
the Council;
•
discomfiture
of the negative forces, who sounded plaintive and inflexible
in
their questioning;
•
reasonable
support from Blix, who did more than not disown us (though
he
could have
been more helpful on the timeline); and
466