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4.1  |  Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
“In the end it was agreed that the dossier should be ‘factual’ … MI6 was also
concerned that it should not contain any information that could threaten its
intelligence sources …
“However, many of the new allegations … are based on assumption and speculation
… evidence about Baghdad’s development of biological weapons … is largely based
on what was discovered by UN weapons inspectors back in 1998.
“Even the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] admits that intelligence gathered after
that date … is far from reliable.”
Mr Hoon’s and Mr Straw’s advice for Mr Blair, March 2002
404.  Mr Hoon and Mr Straw both wrote to Mr Blair before the meeting with
President Bush at Crawford, Texas on 5 to 6 April 2002.
405.  In relation to Iraq’s WMD:
Mr Hoon emphasised the importance of a wider counter-proliferation
strategy in the Middle East, stating that, in objective terms, Iran might be a
bigger problem for the UK than Iraq.
Mr Hoon also stated that a number of issues would need to be addressed
before forces were committed to military action, including the need for a
comprehensive public handling strategy convincingly to explain why such
drastic action against Iraq’s WMD was needed now.
406.  The preparations for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush in early April 2002,
including minutes to Mr Blair from Mr Hoon on 22 March and Mr Straw on 25 March
which raised a range of issues, are addressed in detail in Section 3.2.
407.  In relation to the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD, Mr Hoon wrote:
“The key strategic problem is the spread of WMD – of which Saddam is only one
unpleasant dimension. A more active counter-proliferation strategy is required for the
region as a whole (for example any Iraqi government will seek WMD if Iran is getting
them so our strategy must cover both) …
“… In objective terms, Iran may be the greater problem for the UK … Ironically,
we have Saddam Hussein bound into an established control mechanism. There is
some substance in the US view that he as an individual is at the root of the WMD
risk in Iraq. But any Iraqi government is likely to try and achieve a balance of
forces with Iran …”179
179  Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
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