9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
340.
On 14
December, at the request of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, the
JIC
assessed
the situation in “The Kurdish North”. It judged:
“… few
Kurds subscribe to a sense of Iraqi nationhood. But Kurdish leaders
accept
that the
political and economic conditions for an independent Kurdish State
are
lacking at
present. The Kurds will bide their time (possibly for several
years) while
taking what
incremental steps they can to achieve de facto independence
…
“The
Kurdish north is the most stable region in Iraq … Stability will be
maintained
after
transition to Iraqi (Kurdish) control, now likely in January. There
is greater
violence in
more mixed areas on the periphery of the KRG such as Kirkuk, Tal
Afar,
“We judge
that the Kurds’ very strong bargaining position within the
national
government
means they are well placed to secure many of their key
objectives.
They will
resist any changes to the Iraqi constitution which threaten the
autonomy
of the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the position of the Peshmerga
as
a regional
guard force, or the KRG’s ability to control regional oil resources
and
revenues.”
342.
The JIC judged
that the city of Kirkuk would continue to be “a deeply
emotive
issue”
since:
“Most Kurds
regard the city as inherently Kurdish and an essential asset for
an
independent
Kurdistan … But Kurdish plans will be opposed. The Turkomen
still
claim
Kirkuk as their cultural capital. There are also sizeable Arab
Sunni, Arab Shia,
Assyrian
and Christian communities: most want a special status for Kirkuk as
a
federal
region under some form of power sharing arrangement …
“Violence
has been increasing; since June there have been several
suicide
attacks …
Ethnic and sectarian fighting has also escalated. The bulk of the
violence
can be
attributed to Sunni nationalist insurgents and jihadists, but
elements of Jaysh
al‑Mahdi
and SCIRI’s Badr Organisation have also been implicated …
continued
efforts to
oust mostly Arab residents risk serious violence, both in the city
and in
other mixed
areas.”
343.
On 17
December, Mr Blair visited Baghdad and Basra, accompanied
by
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr Asquith.189
344.
Mr Blair
had a bilateral discussion with Prime Minister Maliki, who had been
very
negative
about Muqtada al‑Sadr and consequently focused on building ISF
capability
“to allow
him to deal with the militias”. In relation to the South “he
welcomed the progress
188
JIC
Assessment, 14 December 2006, ‘Iraq: The Kurdish
North’.
189
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 18 December 2006, ‘Visit to Iraq’.
65