The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
461.
ACM Stirrup
notes that the UK was targeting key individuals, but not JAM as
an
organisation,
and was working to counter the indirect fire attacks on Basra
Palace.
The situation
would improve after the move to Basra Air Station.
462.
On
reconciliation, officials reported:
“… a
certain amount of complacency amongst Iraqi politicians, who
believed that
reconciliation
would simply happen, without the ground having to be
carefully
prepared,
and that a great deal of ad hoc activity was attempted and then,
often,
simply
discarded”.
463.
In a
conversation with President Bush on 22 January, Mr Blair said
that in Basra
the UK had
found that having Iraqis leading work prominently was making a
significant
difference
and that tangible progress on reconstruction paid
dividends.251
Efforts
on
reconciliation
and reconstruction needed to be intensified.
464.
Mr Blair
emphasised the importance of outreach to the Sunni community,
and
proposed
choosing a particular Sunni area in which to agree a cease-fire in
return for
clear
commitments on reconstruction.
465.
On the same
day, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary wrote to the FCO to report
Mr Blair’s
thanks for
the briefing received in response to the request of 8
January.252
466.
Mr Blair
felt that it underlined “the necessity of securing better
reconciliation and
reconstruction
plans and of filling gaps in Iraqi Army capacity” and commissioned
further
reports on
the action being taken against militant JAM in southern Iraq; Lt
Gen Lamb’s
negotiations
in Anbar; and shortfalls and bottlenecks in developing ISF
capability.
467.
At the request
of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, on 24 January the JIC
considered
the Iraqi
Government’s willingness to curb the power of Iraqi Shia militias
and the
implications
of taking action against them.253
“I. Muqtada
al Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and the Supreme Council for
Islamic
Revolution
in Iraq’s (SCIRI) Badr Organisation are behind much of the
anti‑Sunni
sectarian
violence in Iraq. Both militias’ political sponsors are key
elements of the
Shia United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and powerful forces within the Iraqi
Government.
Badr in
particular are deeply embedded in official security and political
structures
and will
not be rooted out in the foreseeable future.
“II. Prime
Minister Maliki still seeks a political accommodation: he wants
Sadr to
exert
greater control over the JAM and rein in the more violent elements.
Maliki
251
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 22 January 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 22 January:
Middle East
Issues’.
252
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 22 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.
253
JIC
Assessment, 24 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Tackling Shia
Militias’.
86