6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
767.
The Cabinet
Office paper concluded with a short section on establishing
a
“Sovereign
Democratic Iraqi Government”:
“To mark
the end of UNMI there will be a progressive return of bureaucratic
and
political
power to Iraqis. A new constitution will be promulgated. National
elections
will be
held. International military forces will withdraw … The new Iraq
would be
welcomed
back to the international community. Under international guidance,
the
new
government could be encouraged to sign a collective non-aggression
pact with
all states
bordering the Gulf.”
768.
The paper did
not address the UK’s responsibilities and obligations during
military
occupation
or the UK’s wider post-conflict contribution.
769.
Sir Peter
Ricketts told the Inquiry:
“At the
period we were developing our thinking about [the] UN lead in the
summer
of 2002,
autumn of 2002, winter of 2002, it was not clear at all the timing
on which
military
action might happen, indeed whether it would happen at all, and
whether
there would
have been full UN authorisation in the second resolution for
it.
“So at that
period, we were talking in more general terms with the UN. By
the
time [in
early 2003] it became clear, the timescale for military action, I
think it was
then also
clear that the US would not be prepared to have UN
administration.
Therefore,
by then we were on the track of working with ORHA [the DoD-led
Office
of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, see Section 6.5]. But I
think it was
a reasonable
planning assumption in the autumn of 2002 that we could work for
a
UN
transitional authority, and at that time the UN still had time to
prepare for it.”378
770.
On 4 November,
the AHGI took stock of all contingency planning papers
nearing
completion.
The record of the meeting stated: “With the new UNSCR nearing
adoption,
it is time
for those departments, which have not already done so, to conclude
their initial
contingency
planning.”379
It listed
papers close to completion on a range of subjects:
•
the impact
of conflict on the international and UK economies
(Treasury);
•
community
relations in the UK (Home Office);
•
humanitarian
implications, including extra material on CBW use
(DFID);
•
Iraqi human
rights abuses (FCO);
•
environmental
impact (DEFRA);
•
impact on
UK airlines and shipping (DfT);380
•
consular
planning (FCO);
•
CBW
dimensions of consular planning (FCO);
378
Public
hearing, 1 December 2009, page 81.
379
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 4 November 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
380
Paper,
Department for Transport, 12 November 2002, ‘Possible Economic
Impact on UK International
Transport
Operations of Action Against Iraq’.
241