The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and, in
the longer term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a
law-abiding
member of
the international community.”1
20.
The policy of
containment was seen as the “only viable way” to pursue
those
objectives.
A “policy of trying to topple Saddam would command no useful
international
support”.
Iraq was unlikely to accept the package immediately but “might be
persuaded
to
acquiesce eventually”.
21.
After
prolonged discussion about the way ahead, the UN Security Council
adopted
resolution
1284 in December 1999, although China, France and Russia
abstained.2
22.
The resolution
established:
•
a new
inspectorate, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection
Commission
(UNMOVIC) (which Dr Hans Blix was subsequently
appointed
to lead);
•
a timetable
to identify and agree a work programme; and
•
and the
principle that, if the inspectors reported co-operation in key
areas,
that would
lead to the suspension of economic sanctions.3
23.
Resolution
1284 described Iraq’s obligations to comply with the
disarmament
standards
of resolution 687 and other related resolutions as the “governing
standard
of Iraqi
compliance”; and provided that the Security Council would decide
what was
required of
Iraq for the implementation of each task and that it should be
“clearly defined
and
precise”.
24.
The resolution
was also a deliberate compromise which changed the criterion
for
the
suspension, and eventual lifting, of sanctions from complete
disarmament to tests
which would
be based on judgements by UNMOVIC on the progress made in
completing
identified
tasks.
25.
Iraq refused
to accept the provisions of resolution 1284, including the
re-admission
of weapons
inspectors. Concerns about Iraq’s activities in the absence of
inspectors
increased.
26.
The US
Presidential election in November 2000 prompted a further UK review
of the
operation
of the containment policy (see Section 1.2). There were concerns
about how
long the
policy could be sustained and what it could achieve.
27.
There were
also concerns over both the continued legal basis for operations in
the
No-Fly
Zones (NFZs) and the conduct of individual
operations.4
1
Joint
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs and the Secretary
of State
for Defence, 17 May 1999, ‘Iraq Future Strategy’.
2
UN Security
Council Press Release, 17 December 1999, ‘Security
Council Establishes New Monitoring
Commission For
Iraq Adopting Resolution 1284 (1999) By Vote of
11-0-4’
(SC/6775).
3
UN Security
Council,‘4084th Meeting Friday 17 December 1999’
(S/PV.4084).
4
Letter
Goulty to McKane, 20 October 2000, ‘Iraq’.
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