6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
would have
the credibility. But we should be open to suggestions. It is
possible
someone
would emerge in the aftermath of conflict – Karzai
did.
b) Who
would head the Transitional Authority? It would be critical to
identify a
heavyweight
figure to head the Transitional Authority. He or she would need
to
be acceptable
to the Iraqis, within the region and wider Muslim world and to
the
US-led
Coalition members …”
595.
The authors
concluded:
“–
Whatever we
do, a UN mandate would be critical in any ‘Day After’
situation
…
– The US
and coalition partners would need to retain responsibility for
Iraq’s
security
for some time after any conflict, irrespective of the
administrative
arrangements
[removed from
the 11 October version] …
– The
US-led military coalition would need to control and administer Iraq
at a
basic level
for a period after the end of the conflict and before the
creation
of an
interim administration. It is not clear how long this period would
last
[replaced
in the 11 October version with: “The US-led
military coalition would
need to
secure Iraq for a period after the conflict, including during
the
creation of
an interim administration. It is not clear how long this
period
would last. We
would want it to be as short as possible”].
– Our
initial assessment is that a UN-led Transitional Authority would
be
most
appropriate for the interim administration of Iraq …
– There are
strong arguments against a US military governorate –
practical,
presentational
and legal. We should not rule it out entirely, but need
to
understand
better why the Americans favour this option and how it
would
work.”
596.
The paper
stated that work should begin on examining a possible UN role in
more
detail, in
particular:
•
mapping key
tasks and posts to be filled;
•
identifying
someone who could head a transitional authority;
•
identifying
Iraqis who could work in an international administration;
and
•
identifying
“appropriate British personnel to take over key roles” [amended
to
“appropriate
personnel (particularly Iraqis)” in the 11 October
version].
597.
The 11 October
version of the paper contained an additional recommendation
that:
“Irrespective
of the administrative arrangements, the US and
Coalition
partners
would need to retain overall responsibility for Iraq’s security
for
some time
after the conflict. How the different security-related tasks
(including
security
sector reform) should be carried out and by whom needs
further
consideration.”
215