9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

884.  Mr Blair went on to consider international disagreement over the nature of the

security threat, and how it might be addressed through the G8. He wrote:

“We need to find a way of forcing the world to confront the dangers it faces; and to

build an agenda capable of consolidating and extending our support.”

885.  On 16 April, Mr Blair and President Bush met in Washington.491 The meeting was

also attended by Dr Rice, Secretary Powell, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr Rycroft.

886.  Mr Blair stressed to President Bush the importance of standing firm, setting out a

clear political vision and implementing it competently.

887.  On Muqtada al-Sadr, Mr Blair said that he needed to be brought out of Najaf alive,

with an agreement to disband his militia. He should not be made a martyr.

888.  In discussion it was clear that US forces had been close to action in Fallujah a

couple of days previously, but had held back based on Ambassador Bremer’s advice

that they would “lose the IGC” if they did so.

889.  On Fallujah, Mr Blair suggested that the Coalition needed to get the balance right

between firmness and initiating further aggression. Any military offensive needed to be

careful, with every effort taken to avoid civilian casualties, and clearly a last resort. The

Coalition could not afford an error. Mr Blair continued that there needed to be a clear

strategy for addressing the grievances of both the Sunnis and the al-Sadr supporters,

including tackling poverty in Sadr City. He again emphasised the importance of better

communication with the Iraqi population.

890.  On the political process, neither the US nor the UK had difficulties with

Mr Brahimi’s emerging plans for the interim government. A new resolution was

necessary, and Mr Blair proposed that it might also include measures to set out a

vision of Iraq as a democratic state.

891.  By 18 April the situation in Fallujah was described by Mr Richmond as “relatively

calm” with talks continuing between the Coalition and a delegation of Fallujan leaders.492

The possibility that offensive operations might resume remained and there was “CJTF-7

talk of allowing one week for dialogue to yield results”.

892.  Negotiations between leaders in Fallujah, GC representatives, US military

commanders and CPA officials had enabled access to the city for emergency services,

the return of civilians, and progress with the handing in of weapons.

491  Letter Rycroft to Adams, 16 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Bush’.

492  Telegram 172 IraqRep to FCO London, 18 April 2004, ‘Fallujah: Update 18 April’.

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