The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in place.
But equally, senior JAM figures do not feel bound by it or him.
Although
attack
levels dipped slightly over the period dealt with in the reporting
this could be
a normal
statistical variation and there have been some particularly
significant and
well-planned
attacks …”
57.
On 8 July, Lt
Gen Lamb reported that there were increasing signs of progress
in
Anbar
province, where the Sunni “Awakening” was gaining momentum, and
slowly
shifting
the security situation against Al Qaida in Iraq
(AQ-I).30
Lt Gen Lamb
commented
that the
engagement was significant, but there remained risks for each of
the four
partners
engaged in the process:
•
For the
Iraqi Government, there were concerns about being able to
control
locally-employed
security forces, of which a large proportion were Sunni;
the
question of
whether, and how, to integrate the “Awakening” movement
within
the Iraqi
Security Forces was to remain a matter of debate in the months
ahead
(see Section
12.1).
•
The tribes and
former Sunni insurgents wanted to be sure that the
Iraqi
Government
would support them and that the MNF would remain in Iraq
long
enough to
reduce the threat from AQ-I, at least to a point that AQ would
be
unable to
return in any strength.
•
There was a
risk for the MNC-I of being fixated by short-term gains and failing
to
manage the
longer-term expectations of the tribal forces being
raised.
•
More widely
for the coalition, there was concern that the developments in
Anbar
might lead
to federalism or too great a degree of provincial
independence,
creating a
risk that Iraq would fragment.
58.
On 8 July,
Mr Asquith reported that he had raised the renewal of the UN
Security
Council
resolution governing the coalition’s activity in Iraq with
Mr Hoshyar Zebari, Iraqi
Foreign
Minister, and Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi.31
59.
Mr Zebari
said the Iraqi Government would want to include in that resolution
“a
commitment
to the start of a coalition drawdown and the perspective of
long-term
security
arrangements with the coalition”.
60.
Vice President
Mehdi said the problem with resolution 1723 (2006) was “the
limits
it imposed
on GoI authority and Iraqi sovereignty”. Another way would have to
be found
of giving
coalition forces cover for operations in Iraq.
61.
Mr Asquith
wrote that he would work with the US to press for substantive
talks
by August.
30
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 8 July 2007, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (260) 8 July
07’.
31
eGram
29226/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Update on
Renewal of UNSCR’.
194