10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
85.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy
Washington,
reported US
State Department (but not yet agreed US Government) views by
telegram
on 23
December.39
The main
policy points included:
•
Provided
the war was short, the US State Department did not
anticipate
a dramatic
impact on oil prices. They were ready to intervene in the
market
as necessary.
•
Control of
the oil sector should be put back into Iraqi hands as soon as
possible.
As far as
possible, any major decisions should be postponed until control
was
handed
back.
•
In the
interim there should be a clear international role to maximise
transparency
and
minimise charges that the US went to war for oil.
•
The US
would “respect the concerns of those countries with existing
contracts”.
86.
A No.10
official wrote to Sir David Manning on 8 January 2003, to
express his
concern
about the US plan to set up a US-administered trust fund for Iraqi
oil revenues.40
The
official argued that:
“… we
should be working hard to persuade the US that, whilst a trust fund
to ensure
the Iraqi
people benefit from oil export revenues is a good idea, it is very
much in
the US’s
(and by extension the UK’s) political interests to get this
done through a UN
forum
… If
control was handed to the UN, it would be much more difficult to
maintain
the
argument that this is about oil.”
87.
The 10 January
2003 meeting of the AHGI considered a joint Cabinet
Office/
Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) paper on
environmental
88.
DEFRA assessed
that the environmental consequences of large-scale
damage
to Iraqi
oil fields would be “significant and dramatic but in most cases
short term”.42
Most of the
impacts would be confined to Iraq. The US would have an important
role
in
responding to environmental contamination, though the extent of its
contingency
planning
was unclear. The UK had the capacity to provide “limited
assistance” to:
•
treat oil
pollution;
•
monitor air
pollution; and
•
help
decontaminate water supplies.
89.
DEFRA stated
that any UK assistance would require funding.
39
Telegram
1690 Washington to FCO London, 23 December 2002, ‘Iraq: the Day
After: Oil and
Reconstruction’.
40
Minute
No.10 [junior official] to Manning, 8 January 2003, ‘What We Do
with Iraqi Oil’.
41
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
42
Paper
Cabinet Office/DEFRA, [undated], ‘Iraq: Environmental Contingency
Planning’.
387