12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1023.
On 8 March,
Maj Gen Cooper reported:
“We have
intelligence that the recidivists within the IPS have resumed their
criminal
activity,
and the population at large is beginning to question our
commitment. Absent
buy‑in from
the MOI, I am clear about the need for us to press ahead
unilaterally
with
[Operation] CORRODE, before the IPS regress to a position from
which they
1024.
The following
week, Maj Gen Cooper reported that Mr Jabr had given the
“green
light” for
MNF to continue with arrest operations under
Op CORRODE.943
He
said
that the
next target was a “relatively junior player”. Mr Jabr was also
reported to have
endorsed
plans to establish a new DIA based at Basra Air
Station.
1025.
On 15 May, a
junior official from PJHQ provided briefing to Mr Ingram
about
IPS members
detained by MND(SE) as part of Op CORRODE.944
He stated
that
Op CORRODE
was established in conjunction with the MOI after the Jameat
incident
on 19
September and aimed to:
•
remove
corrupt individuals in key positions of
responsibility;
•
replace
those individuals with suitable personnel from outside Basra
province;
and
•
reform the
remaining officers.
1026.
The official
wrote that the operation had been constrained because of
“problems
with
political disengagement in Basra” and “nervousness amongst senior
political figures
in
Baghdad”. PJHQ assessed that there were currently ten policemen
detained in
Shaibah, a
military airfield seven miles southwest of Basra. They were likely
to remain
at the
facility “for the foreseeable future”, because the intelligence
against detainees
was not
admissible as evidence. Also, the detainees had connections which
meant that
Basra
judges would be reluctant to try them, or be susceptible to
intimidation if they did
try
them.
1027.
In his weekly
report on 24 May, Maj Gen Cooper described two enemies
in
Basra:
rogue JAM and – “most dangerous” – the “corrupt IPS elements …
which have
murdered so
many Basrawis”.945
He wrote
that he needed political cover from the Iraqi
Government
to tackle IPS reform and would be grateful for UK political
pressure.
1028.
Maj Gen Cooper’s
report on 8 June stated that Op CORRODE had
re‑started
and, on 4
June, there had been the first successful targeting and detention
of a serving
Basra
police officer for more than three months.946
There would
now be “a succession of
942
Minute
Cooper, 8 March 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8 March
2006’.
943
Minute
Cooper, 16 March 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 16
March 2006’.
944
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to PS/Min(AF), 15 May 2006, ‘Iraqi Police Service
(IPS) Detainees Held by
MND(SE)’.
945
Minute
Cooper, 24 May 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 24 May
2006’.
946
Minute
Cooper, 8 June 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8 June
2006’.
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