The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
with
several other coalition partners in addition to the UK, there “just
wasn’t the capacity
or the
political will” to go through the process of negotiating another
Status of Forces
Agreement,
having just agreed the US one.124
So, on
Iraqi advice, the UK went for an
authorising
law in Parliament.
324.
On the Iraqi
political dynamics surrounding the MOU, Mr Prentice told the
Inquiry:
“The whole
issue was … a symptom and also a sort of football, kicked
around
amongst the
political actors who were trying to manoeuvre each other into a
position
of
appearing to be the advocate of continued international occupation
of Iraq.”125
325.
On 13 January,
Mr Miliband’s Private Secretary circulated a draft strategy
for
“UK policy
towards and relations with Iraq following military drawdown” to
members
of
NSID.126
It had been
agreed by officials from all interested departments and
by
Mr Miliband
and concluded that:
“… the UK
will retain an important strategic interest in the emergence of
a
stable,
unitary and broadly democratic Iraq, with a functioning economy,
which
can
contribute to regional stability and prosperity and to global and
European
energy security.”
326.
To retain
influence on bilateral interests in the areas of trade, immigration
and
counter-terrorism,
it was necessary that “the Iraqis believe we take the
relationship
seriously”.
Both the UK’s bilateral objectives and the “wish to draw Iraq into
a
pro‑Western
‘arc of stability’ reaching from Turkey to the Gulf States” would
require
“a high
degree of engagement”. Mr Miliband had decided to maintain the
Embassy
in Baghdad
as the “focal point” for that engagement, with an office in Erbil
to support
“commercial
and other relationship building activity” but in Basra
representation would
be reduced
to a “mini-mission” of three or four staff.
327.
The strategy
paper explained in more detail that the UK had:
“… a
strategic national interest in a strong, stable and non-hostile
Iraq that:
•
acts in
accordance with international law and does not threaten its
neighbours;
•
provides a
counterweight against Iran, ideally as a pro-Western state
…;
•
is able to
deny AQ-I and other terrorist groups a safe haven in its
national
territory;
124
Public
hearing, 6 January 2010, pages 43-45.
125
Public
hearing, 6 January 2010, page 38.
126
Letter
Hickey to Catsaras, 13 January 2009, ‘Iraq: Strategy’, enclosing
Paper ‘Iraq: A Review
of Strategy’.
434