4.4 | The search for WMD

8. Officials had begun to consider the UK contribution to SSE in early February 2003.

9. On 4 February, Mr Tim Dowse, Head of FCO Non-Proliferation Department (NPD),2

chaired a meeting with officials from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the

Ministry of Defence (MOD) to discuss post-conflict WMD issues and the possible

role of UNMOVIC.3

10. The MOD outlined US plans for intelligence exploitation and clean-up over a period

of several years, and explained that the plans envisaged unilateral action by the US with

no role for the UN or other UN Member States.

11. Participants at the meeting agreed that it was very unlikely that US views could

be shifted significantly, but that the US must be made aware of the potential value of

internationalising the clean-up.

12. On 10 February, Mr David Johnson, Head of MOD Iraq Secretariat, sent Mr Hoon

briefing for a visit to Washington (see Section 6.2).4 The briefing included a paper on

“dealing with WMD”.

13. Mr Johnson stated that there had been a good deal of “military-to-military” planning

between the UK and the US on WMD, and that the UK had identified the specialist

contributions it could make at various stages during and after the conflict.

14. The attached paper on WMD stated that SSE required specialist expertise that was

“in very short supply”. To secure maximum value from scarce resources, the US planned

to establish a Coalition Intelligence Exploitation Base (IEB) in southern Iraq reporting

to Lieutenant General David McKiernan, Commander of the Coalition Forces Land

Component Command (CFLCC). IEB capabilities would include:

• Site Survey Teams for initial analysis of sites secured by ground forces;

• Mobile Exploitation Teams to collect evidence;

• Disablement Teams to put facilities out of action;

• laboratories to verify and catalogue evidence; and

• elimination and disposal of WMD.

15. The paper stated that SSE was important to the UK for two reasons:

• achieving the UK’s prime objective of eliminating Iraq’s WMD; and

• securing the hard evidence needed retrospectively to demonstrate the case

for military action, especially if it were to take place without UN authorisation.

2 Non-Proliferation Department (NPD) was renamed Counter-Proliferation Department (CPD) in 2003.

3 Minute NPD [junior official] to Dowse, 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Aftermath: WMD Clean-up’.

4 Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 February 2003, ‘Secretary of State’s Visit to

Washington: Iraq.’

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