6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
430.
The JIC stated
that:
“Unlike
central and northern Iraq the regular army is not reinforced in the
South by
divisions
of the elite Republican Guard, which are forbidden by UNSCR 949
[1994]
from moving
into the No-Drive Zone south of the 32nd parallel.”
431.
The JIC stated
that the regime was “particularly concerned about the lack
of
loyalty of
the Shia” who constituted the “majority of conscripts in the
regular army”.
The absence
of the Republican Guard coupled with low morale, poor equipment
and
limited
training of the Regular Army led the JIC to conclude that the
forces guarding
southern
Iraq were “a
relatively weak first line of conventional defence. They
face
rapid defeat
in the face of a massive military onslaught.”
432.
There were
indications that a division of the Regular Army had
redeployed
“southwards”
to al-Qurnah, “a key town located at a strategic road junction”,
and that
elements of
another had deployed to the al-Faw Peninsula “in mid-January,
apparently
to counter
a possible amphibious landing there”. The JIC knew “little about
Iraqi plans
for the
defence of Basra, but there is as yet no sign of preparations for a
hard-fought
defence of
this or other urban centres in southern Iraq”. There was no mention
in the
Key
Judgements that the al-Faw Peninsula had been
reinforced.
433.
The Assessment
stated that reporting indicated that Saddam Hussein’s regime
had
“contingency
plans for a regional military command structure”, and that he
had:
“…
appointed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid [Chemical Ali] as regional
commander
of the
southern sector … (covering the provinces of Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan
and
Muthanna)
with authority over all forces in the area. Iraq practice in the
Iran/Iraq
war
suggests this would include tactical control over CBW. Ali is a
loyal member of
Saddam’s
inner circle. He was a brutal Governor of occupied Kuwait in
1990‑91.
He also
played a leading role in suppressing the Shia uprising in 1991
and
Kurdish
rebels in the late 1980s (using chemical weapons against the
Kurds). His
appointment
may reflect an Iraqi leadership view that a particularly loyal and
ruthless
figure is
needed to take command in the South in a crisis, both to suppress
the Shia
and to
maintain discipline among the Iraqi forces.”
434.
The JIC
Assessment stated:
“The
relative weakness of Iraqi forces in the South and the fact that
those forces will
face the
brunt of a Coalition attack mean southern
Iraq is the most likely area for
the first use
of CBW against both Coalition Forces and the local
population.”
435.
The Assessment
added that one report from August 2002 had indicated
that
there were:
“… Iraqi
plans to use CBW in southern Iraq to cause mass casualties among
the
Shia in the
event of a US-led attack. The regime would seek to pin the blame
for
the
resulting high-level of casualties on the Coalition.”
451