6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
first weeks
after any conflict. PJHQ had also assumed that DFID would be
responsible
for
providing humanitarian assistance. Dr Brewer’s letter of 24
February to Mr Bowen
suggested
that DFID believed that the most effective way to distribute
humanitarian
assistance
was through IOs and NGOs, and that they would focus their
resources
on areas of
greatest need (rather than necessarily on the UK’s AO). PJHQ
estimated
that
between £30m and £50m a month for two months would be required to
cover the
provision
of humanitarian assistance in the UK AO in the immediate aftermath
of any
conflict.
773.
Ms Short
informed Mr Blair that, without resources greater than
her
department’s
entire contingency reserve, “it would be impossible for DFID to
take
a leading
role in humanitarian delivery in the South-East” of
Iraq.
774.
Ms Short held
a meeting with DFID officials to discuss Iraq, and in particular
the
legality of
“reconstruction work” without a covering UN mandate, on 5
March.335
Ms
Short
concluded
that without a clear mandate for reconstruction, DFID could only
legally fund
or
undertake humanitarian work. The meeting agreed that:
“… under
circumstances where DFID would be involved in humanitarian
work
only,
DFID’s contingency reserve could be drawn upon. This might provide
around
£60‑65m. In
the event that a wider DFID role was possible, should we be asked
by
No.10 or
others how much funding DFID would need, we should mention an
initial
sum of
£100m.”
775.
Ms Short also
agreed the need to:
“… move
away from any expectation that DFID would undertake an
‘exemplary’
role, or …
focus exclusively on any one area. This decision was taken on the
basis
that there
would be substantial need elsewhere in Iraq other than simply in
the
South East;
that the extent of our involvement would not be clear for some
time,
as the
different variables affecting it fell into place; and that we
needed to avoid
being
so closely associated with one area that we were seen as the
‘donor of last
resort’,
for all unfunded needs. However, we should make clear that, given
the right
UN mandate
and authority, we would aim to work alongside the UK military, as
well
as elsewhere,
with others, as appropriate.”
776.
Ms Short said
that she would use Mr Blair’s meeting on 6 March to press him
to:
•
examine
carefully the legality of different post-conflict options for the
UK;
•
press the
US on the need for “sufficient preparation” before any conflict
began;
and
•
consider
options for extending the deadline before the vote on a
Security
Council
resolution or putting forward a revised text.
335
Minute
Bewes to Fernie, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq update: 5 March’.
449