The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
A report to
Congress on 13 October 2005 stated that the US Embassy Iraq and
MNF‑I had
“recently
agreed” to assign responsibility for the Iraqi security ministries’
development to
MNSTC‑I
with effect from 1 October 2005.711
A paper
produced by the MOD for DOP(I) on 15 November stated:
“MNSTC‑I
has overall responsibility for providing assistance … to the IG
[Iraqi
Government]
in the development of the MOD and MOI. This helps to generate
some
short‑term
capacity assistance; however, the UK must use its senior
representation
within this
Command to help the Iraqis build indigenous capacity within the
security
sector.
This can be achieved through full manning of agreed liaison posts
throughout
the IG and
recognising the need for local participation and ownership at all
stages of
the
capacity‑building project.”712
An eGram
from Baghdad on 2 November reported that merging efforts on
MOI
reform
“should combine IRMO civilian expertise with MNSTC‑I military
resources and
manpower”.713
The
“bedding‑in process [was] still under way” and “some tension
between
the
civilian element and the military” remained.
In his
weekly report of 1 January 2006, DCC Smith stated that military
personnel were
gradually
replacing police officers in key CPATT roles.714
He cited
the upcoming vacancy for
a Senior
IPLO Advisor post at CPATT as “a further opportunity for Senior UK
influence” and
that if the
UK was to embed officers into CPATT, it was “essential” that it
include a senior
strategic
position or the UK would “simply be providing more ‘indians’”. DCC
Smith was “not
convinced”
that the US would allow the post to be taken by a “non‑American”.
He described
“a
weakening morale among IPLO colleagues and … increased military
encroachment”.
A report to
Congress on 26 May reported that MNSTC‑I had awarded a contract to
provide
civilian
experts to help build organisational capacity by working alongside
Iraqi officials in
the IMOD
and MOI in February that year.715
An eGram
was sent from Baghdad on 8 September about the development of the
MOI
and
progress of the GCPP‑funded project (as described earlier in this
Section).716
It
said
that a new
structure for the MOI was “now more or less in place”, although
there were still
insufficient
systems in place to reduce corruption and staff had difficulties
delegating tasks
because
they lacked the understanding about how responsibility should be
matched with
accountability
and authority.
The eGram
acknowledged that capacity‑building was a long‑term process but
that
“measurable
progress” had been made. Collaboration with MNSTC‑I had been
“very
good” and
represented “an example of how civilian (DFID) and military
(MNSTC‑I) efforts
can
effectively complement each other”.
711
Report to
Congress, 13 October 2005, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
712
Paper MOD,
11 November 2005, ‘Strategy for the UK’s Contribution to Iraq
Security’.
713
eGram
17261/05 Baghdad to FCO, 2 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Ministry of the
Interior and Policing’.
714
Minute
Smith, 1 January 2006, ‘UK Chief Police Advisor – Iraq: Weekly
Report: Week Ending Sunday
1st
Jan
2006’.
715
Report to
Congress, 26 May 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
716
eGram
39420/06 Baghdad to FCO, 8 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Institutional
Development in the Ministry
of
Interior’.
228