The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
i.
In Iraq the
provincial level provides the link between central government
and
local
administration. Military boundaries should be coterminous with
provincial
boundaries,
which will, in turn, define an AOR.
j. There
may be a need for more rather than less Coalition Forces in the
short
term,
depending on the nature of the outcome of Phase III and the level
of
consent
established as a result. The US will have no further formations
available
until
late April.”
533.
The draft
recommended that “the operational design [of Phase IV] should
be
predicated
on the empowerment of Iraqi institutions and mechanisms of
governance
appropriately
supported by international military and other organisations”. That
concept,
known as
the Joint Commission (JC) approach, was recommended
as:
“… a proven
and familiar model enabling effective civil-military crisis
co-ordination.
It allows
the military to exercise authority and influence, yet promotes and
fosters
a sense of
civilian ownership in the decision-making process. Initially the
military
would lead
on a JC pulling together local authorities and other
organisations
including
Iraqi military where feasible, into a single decision-making body.
At lower
levels,
liaison teams mirror the function of the JC providing province-wide
‘ground
truth’ and
a focus for military advice and support to the civil authorities.
The JC
structure
also provides the information to allow IO [international
organisations]/NGO
to feel
secure and target need. At an appropriate time the JC lead would
transition
to the
civil authorities, with the military adopting a supporting
role.”
534.
Plans for SSR
were “undetermined”. The draft recommended that the
Coalition
“should
attempt to retain as much of the Iraqi Regular Army intact as
possible”.
535.
On levels of
Iraqi consent, the draft stated:
“The
extended UK ‘box’ for Phase III extends north into Wasit province.
We should
anticipate
that the US will ask the UK to assume responsibility for this
province, as
well as
those to the south – Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan. All are predominantly
Shia
and are
generally not pro-regime. However, varying internal and external
influences
determine
the overall threat and level of consent.
“Anti-Coalition
sentiment is predicted as low in all provinces. However, in
the
immediate
post-conflict period, UK forces could become involved in
peace
enforcement
operations between opposing factions. Internal tensions are
greatest
in Wasit
and probable in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Basra should be the
easiest
province to
govern.”
536.
The threat
assessment for each of the four provinces was set out in an
Annex,
the
accuracy of which would be “determined by the nature of the
conflict, adjusted by
a continuous
assessment of risk”.
96