The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
sector, in
order to maximise oil revenues to finance
reconstruction.23
Formal
meetings
began in
November. In parallel, the US National Security Council (NSC)
developed a
longer-term
plan to transfer control of Iraq’s oil infrastructure back to the
Iraqi authorities.
That plan
was approved by President Bush in January 2003.
53.
The Inquiry
has seen no indications that the UK Government was aware of
those
processes
until late January 2003.
54.
From 20
September 2002, the Cabinet Office-led Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
(AHGI)
co-ordinated
all non-military cross-government work on post-conflict issues (see
Section
6.4). The
focus of the AHGI’s work during autumn 2002 was a series of
analytical papers
by the FCO
and other departments on the post-conflict administration and
reconstruction
of Iraq,
and the possible consequences of conflict for the UK.
55.
The AHGI held
its first meeting on 20 September.24
Mr Jim
Drummond, Assistant
Head
(Foreign Affairs) of Cabinet Office OD Sec, wrote to
Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy
Head of
Cabinet Office OD Sec, the day before, suggesting issues for
discussion
and
proposing departmental responsibilities for those issues. The
issues identified by
Mr Drummond
included:
“•
Impact on
world growth and trade, and on the UK economy (Treasury to
write
a note
if they haven’t already).
•
Securing
oil supplies and effect of regime change on world oil
markets
(DTI [Department
of Trade and Industry]).”
56.
The record of
the 20 September meeting of the AHGI stated that:
“Most
[departments] have begun considering implications of military
action.
These
include Treasury on the macro economic impact, DTI on oil markets
…”25
57.
The record
also stated that work should remain “as internal thinking
within
departments”
for the next few weeks.
58.
On 26
September, the FCO sent a paper on post-Saddam government in
Iraq,
entitled
‘Scenarios for the Future of Iraq after Saddam’, to Sir David
Manning.26
It was
circulated separately to members of the AHGI.
59.
The paper
defined scenarios under which Saddam Hussein might lose
power,
the UK’s
four “overarching priorities” for Iraq (termination of Iraq’s WMD
programme,
more
inclusive and effective Iraqi government, a viable Iraq which was
not a threat
23
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
24
Minute
Drummond to Bowen, 19 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
(AHGI)’.
25
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 23 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq’.
26
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the Future
of Iraq after Saddam’
attaching
Paper FCO, [undated], ‘Scenarios for the Future of Iraq after
Saddam’.
382