The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to KBR
under the US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
on
584.
Sir David
Manning raised oil and gas contracts during a meeting
with
Dr Condoleezza
Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, in Washington
on
9 December.339
A TPUK
briefing note produced for Sir David Manning in advance
of
the meeting
summarised the UK’s position:
“It would
be inappropriate for HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] to enter
into
discussions
about any future carve-up of the Iraqi oil industry. None-the-less
it is
essential
that our companies are given access to a level playing field in
this and
585.
At the
meeting, Sir David said that he hoped UK energy companies
“would be
treated
fairly and not overlooked if Saddam left the
scene”.341
Dr Rice
said that it would
be
particularly unjust if companies that had observed sanctions since
1991, a category
which
included UK companies, were not among the beneficiaries of
post-Saddam Iraq.
586.
The US Agency
for International Development (USAID) began the process
of
letting its
major post-conflict reconstruction contracts in December
2002.342
At that
time,
US military
preparations were gathering pace. It was clear that very little
time remained
before a
military campaign.
587.
The UK
participated in two rounds of US/UK/Australia talks on
post-conflict issues,
on 6
November 2002 and 22 January 2003 (see Sections 6.4 and 6.5). There
are no
indications
that commercial interests were discussed during those
talks.
588.
Mr Blair
met with President Bush and Dr Rice in Washington on 31
January 2003
to discuss
post-conflict planning.
589.
A briefing
prepared for Mr Blair by the FCO included in its list of
objectives:
“To
convince President Bush … the US needs to pay much more attention,
quickly,
to planning
on ‘day after’ issues; and that the UN needs to be central to
it.”343
Key messages
included:
“•
Restoring
oil production will be an immediate challenge. Oil sector will
need
some
technology and a lot of capital. We must encourage an open
investment
regime and
a level playing field for foreign companies.”
338
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
339
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
340
Paper TPUK,
29 November 2002, ‘Note for Sir David Manning on UK Oil
Company Interests in Iraq’.
341
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
342
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
343
Paper FCO
Middle East Department, 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to
Camp David,
31 January:
Iraq’.
462