The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
getting a
renewed strong message from UK military and civilians in MND(SE)
on
what was
urgently required and then delivering against those requirements;
and
•
tackling
Iranian interference.
102.
Mr Blair also
wrote that the UK should make clear that “we aren’t
going
anywhere until
the job is done, i.e. we aren’t going to be defeated.
Period.”
He concluded
his minute:
“When I
meet Allawi in September, it should be with a coherent plan to
change
the
situation.”
103.
In a telephone
call with President Bush on 31 August, Mr Blair said he
was
concerned
that Prime Minister Allawi “was not getting exactly what he needed
in terms
of help to
strengthen his political and communications
strategies”.48
He
suggested
that the US
and UK “needed to ensure that Allawi had some visible successes in
the
coming weeks”.
104.
At its meeting
on 1 September the JIC discussed the prospects for the IIG
up
to the
election in January 2005, at the request of the
FCO.49
105.
The JIC
assessed that the IIG’s agenda had so far been dominated by
security,
particularly
the uprising in Najaf. Now that the situation there appeared to
have
been
resolved, the way seemed clear for Prime Minister Allawi to focus
on the Sunni
insurgency
which remained “the main longer-term problem”.
106.
Prime Minister
Allawi had already passed emergency legislation, including a
limited
amnesty,
and re-introduced the death penalty but his attempts to engage the
Sunni
insurgents
directly had only limited success. The security situation was
continuing to
hamper
reconstruction, which in turn was undermining public confidence in
the IIG.
107.
The JIC’s view
was that the political timetable for the January 2005
elections
was ambitious
given the prevailing security environment, with extremists on all
sides
“certain to
attempt to disrupt proceedings”. Although postponement was likely
to suit the
IIG, the
JIC judged that “any significant delay would provoke confrontation
with Sistani
and risk
unrest”.
108.
The JIC’s
analysis of the composition of the Iraqi Interim National Council
is set out
in the
table below. The JIC made clear the figures were simplistic and
should be treated
with
caution. There was considerable overlap between the groups; in
particular, most
members
also had some tribal or provincial affiliation in addition to their
association with
a political
party.
48
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 31 August 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s phonecall
with President Bush, 31 August’.
49
JIC
Assessment, 2 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Political
Prospects’.
412