The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of evil’
speech. France and Germany … could probably be kept on side.
The
French
position is not greatly different from our own. Their policy
remains to keep
up pressure
on Baghdad over inspectors and maintain P5 unity. But they
accept
that US
military action to remove Saddam is now very much on the cards. In
this
event, they
would want the US to fully think through the consequences and
take
adequate
steps to build legitimacy in the UN. Recent German statements
reveal
a preoccupation
with maintaining the rule of law, concern over the
unilateralist
trend in US
policy, but a reluctance to criticise the US overtly … We would
expect
other
EU members to be more overtly critical in the absence of
Security Council
endorsement
of military action.”
101.
Addressing
public and media reaction, Mr Goulty wrote:
“The public
and media reaction to any military action would be mixed
…
“The Arab
and Muslim media and ‘street’ would be deeply hostile
…
“In the
build up to any action, we would need to mount an aggressive PR
[public
relations]
campaign emphasising Iraq’s record of non-compliance with
UNSCRs
and
evidence of WMD reconstitution and other crimes (making maximum use
of
intelligence).
Our basic message, around which further, more detailed
messages
could be
built, might be: ‘Iraq poses a unique threat to the security and
stability
of the
region as well as the rest of the world.’
“Ideally
targets selected would be purely military and steps taken to
avoid
non‑combatant
civilian casualties …”
“Ultimately
the success of any campaign would depend on the success
and
swiftness
of the military action (and removal of Saddam
Hussein).”
102.
Mr Goulty
concluded that planning would:
“… need to
take into account the need to prepare the ground for, and
minimise the
adverse
humanitarian, diplomatic and PR consequences of, what will be a
widely
unpopular
move … The worst possible scenario from our point of view
would be
a prolonged
campaign which left Saddam in power and allowed him to
make
maximum
propaganda gains from Iraqi casualties, whether or not caused
by
the coalition.”
103.
Mr Goulty’s
minute was circulated widely within the FCO, to Ambassadors in
the
region and
to staff in Washington, Paris, Moscow and to the UK Mission in New
York.
104.
Mr John
Sawers, British Ambassador to Egypt, who had been closely
associated
with the
development of the UK’s policy on Iraq as Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary for
Foreign
Affairs (see Section 1.2), responded to Mr Goulty’s minute with a
teleletter
404