The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

254. On 19 June, Adm Boyce was informed that the US was ready for a UK input

into US military planning.

255. Lt Gen Pigott warned that US military planning was taking place “in a policy

void”.

256. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed to

Adm Boyce on 19 June, that he had a “green light to set up the necessary mechanism

for a UK input into Iraq [military] planning” (see Section 6.1).143

257. On 26 June, in a paper summarising the state of US military planning,

Major General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations)

(DCJO(O)), commented that, although US plans contained an implicit assumption

that post-conflict nation-building was achievable, “this has not been addressed by US

planning thus far”.144

258. Hard Lessons stated that, by mid-2002:

“... differences [in Washington] among the three underlying policies for a post-

war framework – rapid transfer to Iraqi control, military administration, or civilian

transitional authority – had yet to be seriously addressed, much less resolved. Nor

had officials reached consensus on the public order and reconstruction requirements

for each scenario.”145

259. A team from the MOD headed by Lt Gen Pigott visited the US to discuss military

planning from 27 to 29 June.146

260. Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, reported the outcome to

No.10 on 2 July: US planners’ assumed mission was “to conduct offensive operations in

Iraq to overthrow the regime, destroy the WMD capability, and reduce the threat to the

Iraqi people, the region and the US”. That was being discussed “in a policy void”: “the

end state to be achieved after conflict has not been defined and the identified military

task currently runs out after the overthrow of the regime”.

261. In early July, Mr Hoon and Mr Straw encouraged Mr Blair to try to influence

US thinking on post-conflict objectives and the strategic framework for Iraq before

President Bush was briefed on US military plans in August.

262. On 2 July, Mr Hoon proposed that Mr Blair convene a “small group of colleagues”

specifically to consider “how best to get the US to address the strategic, as opposed to

the narrowly military, dimension”.147

143 Minute Shireff to PS/SofS [MOD], 27 June 2002, ‘Iraq Planning’.

144 Minute Fry to MA/DCDS(C), 26 June 2002, ‘US Planning for possible military action against Iraq’.

145 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

146 Minute Watkins to Manning, 2 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

147 Minute Watkins to Manning, 2 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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