11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
66.
On 22 May the
AHMGIR met, chaired by Mr Straw.53
67.
Briefing for
the discussion stated that, although the eventual policy was
more
wide‑ranging
than the UK had advocated, in practice Ambassador Bremer
expected
to “allow
those judged ‘clean’ to be re‑employed”.54
The Cabinet
Office author of the
briefing
wrote that the Order would mean that 33,000 people would be banned
from
public
office in Iraq, and observed:
“… this is
more wide‑ranging than the senior level only policy (covering
5,000)
officials
we had advocated, and risks removing many essential but less
culpable
technocrats
from their jobs.”
68.
The AHMGIR
concluded that the UK should “encourage the US to implement
its
policy on
de‑Ba’athification pragmatically to avoid needlessly removing less
culpable
technocrats
from key positions”.55
69.
In a paper for
Mr Blair dated 22 May, Major General Tim Cross, the most
senior
UK secondee
to ORHA, the organisation which pre‑dated the CPA, referred
to
the
recent de‑Ba’athification announcement as having “created some
inevitable
difficulties”, and
counselled pragmatic application of the exemptions for
“individuals
who are
engaged in crucial reconstruction areas, such as power
generation/distribution,
70.
On 27 May,
Mr Sawers reported that a new Iraqi de‑Ba’athification Council
was
“designed
to give Iraqis a role in the de‑Ba’athification process, and advise
Bremer
on how to
apply it in specific cases”.57
The Council
was to be made up of 20 Iraqis,
appointed
by the Coalition.
71.
Ambassador
Bremer, in his account of leading the CPA, described the
Council as an
attempt “to
engage responsible Iraqis from the start in the de‑Ba’athification
process …
to be sure
we were focused on the right people” since the Coalition did not
“know Iraq as
well as the
Iraqis themselves”.58
72.
On 29 May,
Mr Blair met Ambassador Bremer in Basra.59
Ambassador
Bremer
raised the
need for more qualified staff in the CPA as a result of
de‑Ba’athification.
The record
indicates that Mr Blair urged Ambassador Bremer to draw up a
list of the
staff he
required and not to hesitate to ask for additional staff, which he
described as
“a political
priority”.
53
Minutes, 22
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
54
Annotated
Agenda, 22 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
55
Minutes, 22
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
56
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 23 May 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction’ attaching
Paper Cross, 22 May 2003,
‘Iraq Reconstruction:
Some Thoughts for the PM in his Discussions with President
Bush’.
57
Telegram 22
IraqRep to FCO London, 27 May 2003, ‘Iraq: new ORHA
initiatives’.
58
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Threshold,
2006.
59
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 29 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting with
Bremer, 29 May’.
15