The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
740.
On 12
February, Mr Straw told the AHMGIR:
“Brahimi …
and [Grand Ayatollah al-] Sistani had met and agreed that
direct
elections
should take place but had not specified the timing. Neither wanted
direct
elections
before June … We were leaving decisions on the TNA
[Transitional
National
Assembly] selection process to Brahimi and the UN
team.”403
741.
An FCO paper
on ‘UK Representation in Iraq Post-Transition’ was discussed at
the
same
meeting of the AHMGIR on 12 February. It contained proposals for an
Embassy in
Baghdad, a
Consulate General in Basra and a representative in the
North.
742.
The paper
stated that the estimated combined start-up and running costs
for
Baghdad and
Basra would be over £50m in 2004/05. If the UK presence remained
the
same size,
annual running costs would be around £36m thereafter, of which £22m
would
be for
security.
743.
Ministers
agreed the shape of British representation and tasked officials
to
consider
the practicalities, including funding.
744.
Separately,
the paper suggested that consideration needed to be given to
how
international
assistance in the South should be co-ordinated after CPA(South)
closed on
30 June.
The AHMGIR requested a paper on co-ordination of the international
effort in
the South,
for discussion at its next meeting.
745.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 12 February that two recent large bomb
attacks
were believed
by a minister in the GC to have been organised by “infiltrators”
with
support
from inside Iraq but “such attacks would not be allowed to
destabilise the
746.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported on 14 February that he was not being
consulted
by
Ambassador Bremer on the TAL, and that he had sent a formal note
reminding
him that
the UK was one of the Occupying Powers, and could not agree to the
TAL
arrangements
unless properly consulted.405
747.
Ambassador
Bremer had said that the matter was out of his hands and had
been
determined
in Washington.406
748.
After Sir
David Manning spoke to Mr Straw and then to the US, including
Dr Rice,
channels of
communication and consultation were restored.
403
Minutes, 12
February 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
404
Cabinet
Conclusions, 12 February 2004.
405
File note
Manning, 17 February 2004, ‘Iraq’.
406
File note
Straw, 16 February 2004, ‘Sir Jeremy Greenstock’.
328