12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
452.
On 8 July,
officials in the FCO advised Mr Straw that he should write to
Mr Blunkett
to seek
nominations of up to 200 police officers for firearms training with
a view to
drawing on
this pool for future deployments to Iraq when conditions were
judged by
DCCs White
and Brand to be right.396
453.
On 18 July,
Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blunkett requesting the nomination
of a pool of
officers
for firearms training in Iraq to meet the request from the
CPA.397
The letter
made
clear that
a further assessment would be needed, prior to deployment, of the
security
situation
in Iraq and the appropriateness of deploying UK police
officers.
454.
The original
minute to the Foreign Secretary did not propose that he should
write
to
Ministers in the Scottish Government or to the Northern Ireland
Secretary, responsible
respectively
for police forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland.398
ACPO
Scotland was
instead
approached at official level.399
455.
ACPO issued a
letter to police forces in England and Wales on 31 July
informing
them of a
trawl notice to be issued by the FCO seeking volunteers to form a
pool of
officers
for potential deployment to Iraq.400
456.
By September
2003, 260 police officers had applied to the pool.401
457.
On 10 August,
DCC Brand asked for the deployment of four police officers –
ideally
with a
background in intelligence and operational planning – to staff a
Joint Command
Centre
(JCC) in Baghdad designed to prevent friendly fire
incidents.402
458.
Former DCC
Brand told the Inquiry how his request for support staff had
eventually
been
met:
“[Lt]
General Viggers [the Senior British Military Representative – Iraq]
… loaned
me a
captain … so that I had somebody who could answer my phone and
make
appointments
whilst I was in other meetings. It wasn’t until the end of
September
that I had
an administrative assistant, and then, sometime in October, when
the
Ministry of
Defence police contingent came out and I was able to take somebody
as
a sort of …
staff officer.
“It was …
quite challenging to … operate at a two‑star level, engage at the
highest
level
diplomatically and militarily – when one is answering one’s own
phone and
trying to
do all of the administration that supports that type of
activity.”403
396
Minute FCO
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 8 July 2003, ‘Iraq:
Police Reform’.
397
Letter
Straw to Blunkett, 18 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Police
Reform’.
398
Minute FCO
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 8 July 2003, ‘Iraq:
Police Reform’.
399
Minute UND
[junior official] to Buck, 18 September 2003, ‘Iraq Police Reform:
UK Contribution’.
400
Letter
Kernaghan to President of ACPO, 31 July 2003, ‘Creation of a Pool
of Police Officers for
Possible
Service in Iraq’.
401 Annotated
Agenda, 18 September 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
402
Minute
Brand, 10 August 2003, ‘Report from Iraq – Douglas
Brand’.
403
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 40‑41.
157