The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
90.
In October
2009, before the Inquiry held its first evidence hearings, Sir John
Chilcot
invited
anyone with information relevant to its Terms of Reference to get
in touch.
Sir John
said:
“There may
be someone out there with a crucial bit of information which could
show
an issue in
a different light. It would be a great shame if that opportunity
was missed.”
91.
In response,
almost 1,500 contributions were received between 2009 and
2016.
The Inquiry
has considered every submission carefully and is very grateful to
all those
who took
the time to write.
92.
A small number
of articles submitted for a series of seminars with experts on
Iraq
were
published in 2009. After considering which other submissions to
publish, the
Inquiry
decided:
•
not to
publish those submissions that offered suggested questions for,
or
analysis
of, evidence hearings, although they were of value whilst hearings
were
taking
place;
•
not to
publish submissions offering suggestions on the conduct of the
Inquiry;
•
not to
publish submissions concerning matters outside the Inquiry’s
Terms
of Reference;
•
not to
publish details of personal experiences that were shared on
a
private basis;
•
not to
re-publish information already in the public domain, for
example
newspaper
articles or published reports, although the Inquiry was grateful
for
the many
articles, books and papers it received; and
•
not to
publish anything it deemed offensive or
incomprehensible.
93.
The
submissions published on the Inquiry’s website alongside this
Report are
therefore
those which provide evidence to the Inquiry. In many cases they are
from
individuals
or organisations with directly relevant expertise or
experience.
94.
The fact of
publishing a submission does not in any way imply the
Inquiry’s
acceptance
of the views or statements it contains.
95.
Between 12
July and 13 September 2010, the Inquiry extended an open
invitation
to
international lawyers to submit their analyses of the arguments
relied upon by the
UK
Government as the legal basis for military intervention in Iraq. In
a small number of
cases, the
Inquiry also approached expert individuals directly and invited
them to submit
their
views.
16