The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Plan, and
from activity with Sunni groups in Anbar and elsewhere, enhanced
effort was
needed on
the political agenda and in particular on reconciliation. A
high‑profile ‘grand
bargain’
was needed to provide a framework for work like that under way in
Anbar.
801.
Mr Blair
considered that a longer‑term military commitment in support of
Iraq, on
a different
basis, was needed and should be framed as conditional upon progress
with
reconciliation.
802.
Mr Browne
wrote to Mr Blair on 5 May with his assessment of the
prospects for
successful
reconciliation in Iraq, based on a visit to Basra and Baghdad
earlier the same
“Baghdad
reinforced my belief that political discord is adding to the
effects of terrorist
tactics in
fuelling sectarian strife.”
803.
Mr Browne
wrote that, even though there was no agreed concept of
reconciliation,
a package
was “deliverable”. Work started from a “poor position” but it had
US support.
A realistic
outcome would be to:
“… reduce
the irreconcilable elements but in the end there will still be a
significant
terrorist
threat beyond the reach of the Iraqi state system in the short and
medium
term.”
804.
Mr Browne
considered that a visit by Mr Blair to Iraq, planned for later
in the month,
would be
“an excellent opportunity to formalise a route to reconciliation”.
Mr Browne
suggested
that might mean:
“A joint
UK/Iraqi PM and Iraqi Presidential statement; a clear public
commitment
from senior
members of the GOI [Government of Iraq]; a meeting with a
member
of the
Majar; and perhaps the launch of a suitable international
commission of
advisers.”
805.
Mr Blair
spoke to Prime Minister Maliki on 7 May, and congratulated him on
the
outcome of
the International Compact meeting.437
They
discussed the security situation
in Baghdad
and Basra and the importance of MNF‑I co‑operation with local
political and
security
institutions.
806.
Alluding to
the continuing difficulties in Basra, Mr Blair noted the
difficulty in trying
to
establish which political forces were the appropriate ones to work
with – Prime
Minister
Maliki said that he was not asking UK forces to deal with militias,
but with
politicians
who had an influence on those militias, as the Iraqi Government
did.
807.
On 9 May,
Mr Asquith reported: “The Political logjam looks as if it
might be
breaking
up.”438
It appeared
that the political parties were on the verge of a deal
that
436
Letter
Browne to Blair, 5 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.
437
Letter
Banner to Hickey, 7 May 2007, ‘Conversation with Iraqi Prime
Minister’.
438
eGram
19585/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
150