The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“Senior
Iraqis” agreed “that Iraq should maintain a WMD capability”, but
if
UNMOVIC
made “demonstrable progress which threatens to overcome
Iraq’s
policy of
deception and concealment, and Saddam refuses to give ground,
there
could be
pressure on key insiders to break with Saddam in order to ensure
their
own
survival”.
27.
Following
Mr Blair’s discussion with President Bush on 6 November
(see
Section 3.5),
No.10 commissioned a psychological profile of Saddam Hussein, “not
least
for the
pointers this may give on splitting off Saddam from his
regime”.8
28.
On 14
November, the Private Secretary to Sir Richard Dearlove, Chief
of the
Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS), sent Mr John Scarlett, Chairman of
the JIC, a draft
psychological
profile of Saddam Hussein, based on a Defence Intelligence Staff
(DIS)
document
produced in late 2001.9
29.
The key points
identified in the profile included:
“•
Personal
survival, survival of the regime, and Iraqi‑led Arab unity are the
three
most
powerful factors that motivate Saddam …
•
He thinks
strategically and will operate tactically. He is a judicious
political
calculator
…
•
His
propensity to take risks coupled with vigilance and a task‑oriented
approach
to problems
has led to generally judicious decision making. However,
his
tendency to
seek and filter information to support his beliefs has created
a
skewed
appreciation of any risks he may take …
•
The result
is perpetuation of a deeply entrenched belief that the intention
of
outsiders
is unjust and it is they who are responsible for the ills in Iraq
…”
30.
The profile
stated that Saddam Hussein would “not wish a conflict in which
Iraq
will be
grievously damaged and his stature as a leader destroyed”. His
perception of
damage was
“far more focused on reputation than on physical or economic
standing”.
Saddam
Hussein would:
“… use
whatever force is necessary. This is reflected in [...] Saddam’s
willingness
to use
WMD both internally and regionally if he believes he is about to
fall.”
31.
Addressing
Saddam Hussein’s decision‑making, the profile stated:
“Although
his actions may at times appear obtuse and reckless to the West,
Saddam
is a
rational actor … Each time he defies the UN or US he will push
them, testing
8
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 6 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with Bush,
6 November’.
9
Letter PS/C
to Scarlett, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Psychological Profile of
Saddam’ attaching
Paper
‘Saddam
Hussein, DIS Psychological Profile Updated’.
10