Executive
Summary
692.
There was a
strong case for reinforcing MND(SE) so that it could handle
its
high‑priority
tasks (providing essential security for reconstruction projects,
protecting
existing
infrastructure, guarding key sites and improving border security to
inhibit
the import
of arms from Iran) effectively in changing circumstances. Those
tasks all
demanded a
higher level of manpower than was available. Although additional
military
personnel
were deployed in September 2003, mainly to fill existing gaps in
support for
reconstruction
activities, their numbers were far too small to have a significant
impact.
693.
The failure to
consider the option of reinforcement at this time was a
serious
omission
and Lt Gen Reith and Gen Walker should have ensured that
UK force levels in
MND(SE)
were formally reconsidered in autumn 2003 or at the latest by the
end of the
year.
Increases in UK force levels in order to address the security
situation should have
been
recommended to Ministers. Any opportunity to regain the initiative
and pre‑empt
further
deterioration in the security situation was lost.
694.
In October,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Lieutenant General
Ricardo
Sanchez,
Commander Combined Joint Task Force‑7, had “come to recognise
that
Coalition
operations are at a standstill and that there is a need to regain
momentum”.240
Doubts
started to build about the chances of credible elections based on a
legitimate
constitution
in the course of 2004 and work began to look for alternatives to
the plan set
out by
Ambassador Bremer. The “bloodiest 48‑hour period in Baghdad since
March”,241
including
an attack on the al‑Rashid Hotel in Baghdad’s Green Zone, was
sufficient
to convince
some that a pivotal point in the security situation had been
reached.
695.
When President
Bush visited London in November, Mr Blair provided him with
a
paper
written by Sir Jeremy Greenstock which argued that security
should be the highest
priority in
the run‑up to June 2004, when the Iraqi Transitional Government
would take
power.
Sir Jeremy suggested that troop levels should be looked at
again and highlighted
“the
dangers we face if we do not get a grip on the security situation”
as a topic that
President
Bush and Mr Blair needed to discuss in stark
terms.
696.
The
constraints within which the UK was operating as a result of the
limited scale
of forces deployed
in Iraq were articulated clearly for the Chiefs of Staff
in December.
Lt Gen Fry
argued that a strategy of “early effect”242
was needed
which prioritised
campaign success.
Operation TELIC was the UK “Main Effort”, but
deploying additional
resources
in a way that was compliant with the Defence Planning
Assumptions would
require the
withdrawal of resources from other operations.
697.
On 1 January
2004, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote bluntly: “This theatre
remains
240
Telegram
230 IraqRep to FCO London, 24 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Security
Update’.
241
Telegram
1426 Washington to FCO London, 28 October 2003, ‘Iraq: US Views 28
October’.
242
Minute
DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 5 December 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Review of UK
Military Strategy for Iraq’.
243
Telegram
337 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Six Final Months
of Occupation’.
95