The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
332.
Sir Hilary
observed that “formally” it was for CPA(Baghdad) to own and
resource the
plan “but
that is not quite how things work in practice … there is a certain
expectation that
the regions
should take a lead to sort out their own problems”. He suggested
that a “high
level task
force” should be established in Whitehall to provide the support he
needed.
333.
The Essential
Services Plan is covered in detail in Section 10.1.
334.
Immediately
after the meeting on 2 September Mr Cannon wrote to the FCO
with a
request for
eight pieces of advice, to be delivered two days
later.203
335.
The advice was
to cover police and internal security, infrastructure in the
South,
CPA
finances, oil and electricity, media, the political process,
conditions of service for UK
civilian
staff, and Iraqi assets overseas.
336.
Mr Cannon
wrote that Mr Blair “wanted action on Iraq taken forward with
a
heightened
sense of urgency”. He had observed that “the key to the security
situation in
Iraq is the
rapid mobilisation of an effective Iraqi police
force”.
337.
In response to
Sir Hilary’s telegrams, Mr Blair wanted “the maximum
possible
support
given to Sir Hilary’s proposals for immediate infrastructure
projects in the
CPA(South)
area, with appropriate military cover”.
338.
Mr Cannon’s
letter asked Sir Jeremy Greenstock to talk through the
issues
discussed
with Ambassador Bremer, so as to avoid “cutting across [his]
position in
raising
these issues with Bush”.
339.
On 3
September, the JIC produced an Assessment of threats to security in
Iraq.204
Its first
three Key Judgements were:
“I. The
security environment will remain poor, and will probably worsen
over the next
year,
unless the Coalition, in conjunction with Iraqis, can reverse
current trends.
There are
likely to be more spectacular attacks.
II. The
violent opposition comprises former regime officials, Sunni Iraqi
extremists,
Sunni
‘Mujahedin’ and Sunni Islamic terrorist organisations, mainly Ansar
al-Islam.
But we do
not know who is responsible for specific attacks.
III. Sunni
Islamic extremists/terrorists see Iraq as the new focus for Jihad.
They are
likely to
present the main long-term threat to Coalition interests in Iraq,
as they can
draw on
external recruits and finance.”
340.
The JIC
recorded daily attacks on the Coalition, including a recent
increase in the
South. The
most significant attacks were vehicle bombs in Najaf and Baghdad
and at the
Jordanian
Embassy and UN HQ. There had been attacks using mortars,
man-portable
surface-to-air
missiles, small arms and – increasingly – small improvised
explosive
devices.
Those conducting attacks had shown “growing competence,
determination
and
sophistication”.
203
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 2 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Prime
Minister’.
204
JIC
Assessment, 3 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Threats to
Security’.
264