9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
“V. Against
any determined and competent opponents in the north, ISF will
still
need help
for at least the next few years with airborne surveillance, heavy
fire
power
(including from the air) and embedded coalition training teams. The
Kurds’
Peshmerga
forces in the Kurdistan Region face fewer challenges.”
170.
Considering
longer-term trends, the JIC judged that:
“In the
longer term, we assess that the balance of power is gradually
changing:
as the
Baghdad government becomes more confident and assertive, it is
likely to
be less
willing to accommodate Kurdish intransigence, and the risk of
confrontations
will rise,
especially over disputed oil revenue sharing. KRG political unity
is not
assured.
Power sharing between the two main political parties, the PUK and
KDP, is
working
well. But tensions following their civil war in 1995-1998 remain.
We assess
that the
process of who succeeds PUK leader Talabani (now 75) … will test
stability.”
171.
Mr Brown
wrote to Prime Minister Maliki on 11 August, attaching a copy of
his
22 July
statement to the House of Commons.62
In the
covering letter he explained
that the UK
did not want to retain combat troops inside Iraq once their current
tasks
(particularly
the training and mentoring of the 14th Division of the Iraqi Army
in Basra)
had been
completed. He expected that, subject to conditions on the ground,
it would be
possible to
complete training of 14 Division in 2009 and start to reduce the
number of
UK troops
in southern Iraq. He explained that in order to complete the
training, the UK
would
require a firm legal basis for the presence of personnel in Iraq
beyond the end
of 2008.
172.
Mr Brown
continued by addressing a concern expressed by Prime Minister
Maliki
about the
detention of Iraqi citizens by UK forces in Basra. He explained
that the UK
held only
two criminal detainees, on remand awaiting transfer to the Iraqi
criminal justice
system to
be tried for involvement in the murders of two British servicemen.
Mr Brown
explained
that only nine individuals had been interned in Basra in 2008, but
“the UK
is not
at present holding any security internees”.
173.
During a
meeting with Mr Prentice on 17 August, Prime Minister Maliki
agreed
to open
discussions on a UK SOFA in late August or early
September.63
Mr Prentice
reported
that the equivalent US/Iraqi negotiations were at a delicate stage,
with no
guarantee
of a result.
174.
Mr Prentice
attended the Iraqi National Security Council on 24 August,
and
reported
that Iraqi Ministers had requested advice on how long it would take
for Iraq
to be able
to handle its own security needs without outside help, to inform
political
decisions
on how long an MNF-I presence was required.64
Defence
Minister Abdul
62
Letter
Brown to Maliki, 11 August 2008, [untitled].
63
eGram
32303/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 19 August 2008, ‘Iraq: UK-Iraq:
Meeting with PM Maliki:
Agreement
to Open Negotiations on a SOFA’.
64
eGram
33064/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 August 2008, ‘Iraq: National
Security Council,
24 August
2008’.
409