3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

“Others suggested that the threat wasn’t as serious as we thought … we had a

warning like a blaring siren. Years of intelligence pointed overwhelmingly to the

conclusion that Saddam had WMD. He had used them in the past. He had not met

his responsibility to prove their destruction. He had refused to co-operate with the

inspectors … The only logical conclusion was that he was hiding WMD. And given

his support of terror and his sworn hatred of America, there was no way to know

where those weapons would end up.

“Others alleged that America’s real intent was to control Iraq’s oil and satisfy Israel.

Those theories were false. I was sending our troops into combat to protect the

American people.

“I knew the cost would be high, but inaction had a cost, too. Given everything we

knew, allowing Saddam to remain in power would have amounted to an enormous

gamble. I would have had to bet that every major intelligence agency was wrong or

that Saddam would have a change of heart. After seeing the horror of 9/11, that was

not a chance I was willing to take. Military action was my last resort. But I believed

it was necessary.”241

699. Mr Blair described the Summit in his memoir as a:

“… slightly surreal event. On the face of it we were still pushing for a political

solution. There were some last minute hopes of an Arab initiative to get Saddam

out; or of a Saddam capitulation. George was content to adopt the line that we were

going to hold out every last hope for peace …

“We rehearsed again the main arguments. He was completely calm. He thought

we had to send out a message of total clarity to the world: have anything to do with

WMD and we are going to come after you. More even than me, he was focused on

the possibility of terrorist groups getting hold of WMD material: ‘I am just not going

to be the president on whose watch it happens’ …”242

700. Mr Blair concluded:

“So when I look back … I know there was never any way Britain was not going to

be with the US at that moment, once we went down the UN route and Saddam was

in breach. Of course such a statement is always subject to in extremis correction.

A crazy act of aggression? No, we would not have supported that. But given the

history, you couldn’t call Saddam a crazy target.

“Personally I have little doubt that at some point we would have to have dealt with

him. But throughout I comforted myself, as I put it in the Glasgow speech, that if we

were wrong, we would have removed a tyrant; and as a matter of general principle,

I was in favour of doing that.

241 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

242 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

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