The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
706.
The JIC
Assessment of 19 March 2003 recognised that Iraq’s ability to
use
chemical or
biological weapons was likely to be limited.
707.
Iraq’s
statements that it had no weapons or programmes were dismissed
as
further
evidence of a strategy of denial.
708.
In
addition, the extent to which the JIC’s judgements depended on
inference
and
interpretation of Iraq’s previous attitudes and behaviour was not
recognised.
709.
At no stage
was the hypothesis that Iraq might not have chemical,
biological
or nuclear
weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC
or
the policy
community.
710.
After its 9
September 2002 Assessment, the JIC was not asked to
review
its
judgements on Iraq’s capabilities and programmes which underpinned
UK
thinking.
Nor did the JIC itself suggest such a review.
711.
As a result
there was no formal reassessment of the JIC judgements,
and
the 9
September Assessment and the 24 September dossier provided part of
the
baseline
for the UK Government’s view of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions
on its
chemical,
biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
712.
The
inspections revealed in early 2003 that Iraq had undoubtedly been
pursuing a
range of
proscribed activities which it was keen to conceal, including
enhancements to
its
ballistic missile capabilities and procurement or attempted
procurement of dual-use
items that
could have had a use in the production of chemical and biological
agents.
It also
wanted to preserve its conventional capabilities.
713.
But the
inspectors were also reporting that they had not found any evidence
of
current
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programmes in
Iraq.
714.
Dr Blix
reminded Mr Blair on 6 February that UNSCOM had said material
was
unaccounted
for, not that it was present in Iraq. He made the same point in his
report to
the
Security Council on 14 February, adding that if the material did
not exist, “credible
evidence to
that effect” was needed.
715.
The dismissal
of Iraq’s persistent denials that it had retained weapons of
mass
destruction
has to be considered in the context that past Iraqi statements had
often
been shown
to be untrue. The evidence of other proscribed activities may
have
served to
reinforce confidence in the intelligence and in UK assessments
about Iraq’s
other activities.
716.
Given the
weight which rested on the JIC’s judgements about
Iraq’s
possession
of WMD and its future intent for the decision in March that
military
action
should, if necessary, be taken to disarm Iraq, a formal
reassessment of the
JIC’s
judgements should have taken place.
416