The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1232. Mr Dodds recommended that the UK:

• should continue to emphasise to the US that a further UN resolution was vital;

• should stress to the US that UK military capability was stretched to the limit; and

• should not be too ready to take on a two-star command in the aftermath without

“the necessary guarantees”. It carried the risk of costs “we cannot afford both

militarily and financially”. This was an issue on which the Treasury disagreed

with the MOD. Mr Brown’s input “could be invaluable”.

1233. Mr Dodds advised that Mr Brown might have a view on “whether to press for a

smaller commitment than the £1bn ‘medium’ scale deployment that MOD/FCO have

offered”.

1234. Mr Dodds explained that the Treasury was feeding those thoughts into FCO

papers for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Camp David on 26 and 27 March.

He concluded that it would be useful if Mr Brown could “make an input” at Cabinet (see

Section 10.1).

1235. The FCO response to Mr Blair’s request of 21 March for further advice on

the narrow question of the UK military contribution to post-conflict Iraq continued

the pre-invasion pattern of analysis and advice that separated military from

civilian concerns.

1236. The FCO advice, which reflected Treasury concerns and had been agreed

with the MOD, warned of the substantial risk that, without a resolution, the UK

“would become trapped” into a higher level of commitment than planned.

1237. The FCO advised that it would not be possible to decide on the size of a

UK military sector before establishing the nature of the task and the scale of the

Coalition resources available.

1238. The FCO did not address the relationship between the size of a military

sector and the wider contingent liabilities, including the impact on potential UK

civilian responsibility for administration and reconstruction.

1239. On 25 March, the FCO sent its response to Mr Blair’s request for further advice

on the size of any UK sector, the duration of the UK commitment and the exit strategy.526

1240. The FCO advice, agreed with the MOD and copied to DFID and the Treasury,

emphasised the risk of “serious long term damage to the Armed Forces” if the UK

commitment was not reduced to a third of existing levels by the autumn, but stated that it

526 Letter Owen to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to Post-Conflict Iraq’.

530