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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Advice from Cabinet Ministers
CABINET, 21 MARCH 2002
442.  Mr Blair told Cabinet on 21 March that he would be meeting President Bush
in the first week of April:
“Their talks would focus on how to respond to the threat to international security
represented by the Iraqi regime, efforts to build on the success of the Coalition’s
intervention in Afghanistan, how to achieve progress in the Middle East Peace
process and gathering support for the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s
Development.”159
443.  No further discussion of the issues is recorded.
444.  Cabinet also discussed the deployment of an infantry battlegroup based on
45 Commando Royal Marines to Afghanistan, and the nature of the task it would
perform. Mr Blair concluded that:
“… the troops were supported by the majority of the people in Afghanistan and would
not be seeking to occupy territory, there was substantial United States air cover and
there were troops from several Coalition partners involved. There was no parallel
with the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The total number of British
forces engaged in operations related to Afghanistan was substantial, but still only
one-tenth of the number deployed during the 1991 Gulf War.”
445.  The deployment of the battlegroup, which was the largest deployment of UK forces
since 1991, had been announced on 18 March.160 That is addressed in Section 6.1.
MR HOON’S ADVICE, 22 MARCH 2002
446.  Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 22 March emphasising the importance of
a counter-proliferation strategy in the Middle East.
447.  On Iraq, Mr Hoon advised that the UK should support President Bush and
be ready to make a military contribution; and that UK involvement in planning
would improve the US process. One of Mr Blair’s objectives at Crawford should,
therefore, be to secure agreement to the UK’s participation in US military
planning.
448.  Mr Hoon also stated that a number of issues would need to be addressed
before forces were committed to military action, including the need for a
comprehensive public handling strategy convincingly to explain why such drastic
action against Iraq’s WMD was needed now.
159  Cabinet Conclusions, 21 March 2002.
160  House of Commons, Official Report, 18 March 2002, columns 37-48.
466
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